## 1NC

### 1

#### Antitrust reform to promote competition is fundamentally based on a logic of economism

White 16 Mark D. White is Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the College of Staten Island, City University of New York, , On the Justification of Antitrust: A Matter of Rights and Wrongs, Antitrust Bulletin; London Vol. 61, Iss. 2, (Jun 2016): 323-335

Antitrust has long been an area of law in which economic reasoning maintains a tremendous amount of influence, due to the plainly economic nature of the matters at its core: market competition, profits, and consumer well-being. Notwithstanding the positive microeconomic analysis at its heart, however, antitrust remains an area of law and, as such, necessarily involves issues of rights and justice as well--aspects that are often neglected among determinations of industry concentrations, consumer surplus, and optimal penalties. In this paper, I examine the interrelated issues of capitalism, antitrust, and democracy from the perspective of property rights and corrective justice, an approach that stands in stark contrast to the utilitarian nature of welfare economics on which traditional understandings of antitrust are based. I start with a discussion of the contrast between these two perspectives and their implications for the nature of capitalism and the role of the state. Next, I look at antitrust through the lens of rights and justice, asking which and whose rights are violated by the behavior forbidden by antitrust as well as antitrust enforcement itself. Finally, I consider the extent to which antitrust can be considered a valid response of a democratic government to the concerns of its citizens, which brings the paper back to the issue of the understanding of the function of capitalism and the market as well as the rights on which they rely. II. The Nature of the Capitalism and the Role of the State The economic foundation of antitrust law is a straightforward application of welfare economics, the goal of which is to maximize welfare (understood to be the sum of consumer and producer surplus) or achieving efficiency (by ensuring the marginal benefit of output equals its marginal cost). In terms of industrial structure, perfect competition--the hypothetical system in which an infinitely large number of infinitesimally small firms produce an identical product in an environment of perfect and complete information and costless entry and exit--is taken to be the ideal, and the government is charged with taking whatever action necessary to bring real-world industries that differ significantly from this ideal closer to it. Due to scarcity of resources available to the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, these agencies typically reserve this action for what they judge to be the most deviant forms of industry, such as oligopolies that are tending toward monopoly or firms with significant market power that use this power in way that disadvantages consumers and competitors. [1]

#### Economic predictions about markets fail---specifically in the context of antitrust

Rozga 20 Kaj Rozga is a former Federal Trade Commission attorney with a breadth of antitrust experience representing clients in litigation, cartel, and transactional matters, How tech forces a reckoning with prediction-based antitrust enforcement, <https://techlawdecoded.com/how-tech-forces-a-reckoning-with-prediction-based-antitrust-enforcement/> \*Edited for ableist language which we do not endorse

Tech is testing the limits of a half-century experiment in antitrust in which predictions made by experts have guided enforcement of the law. Over that time, it has become increasingly common for the lawfulness of a given merger or monopolist’s conduct to be decided by predicting its actual effects on competition. On first blush, it seems a sensible approach. Ostensibly, it is a rational replacement of what came before it, which was a set of hard-and-fast rules that trained antitrust on the protection of market conditions believed conducive to competitive outcomes, with less regard for how competition was actually impacted in an individual case. But lawyers and economists may have jumped the gun in thinking themselves up to the task. A half decade of experience with the predictive approach to antitrust, bolstered by research in uncertainty and decision-making in other fields, suggests that little more than wishful thinking may support the premise that predictions about complex markets can be accurate enough to guide competition policy. And to make matters worse, the prediction-making apparatus has been focused exclusively on an overly restrictive subset of competition concerns that only serve to help consumers to buy more things for less money. The result has been the consolidation of large swaths of the economy. These flaws are especially pervasive in tech. Enforcers reviewing digital mergers or investigating the tech giants’ monopolistic conduct have been practically ~~paralyzed~~ [overwhelmed] by the burden of having to make predictions about competitive effects in difficult-to-understand, quick-to-change tech markets. This is apparent not only from a decade of missed opportunities to prevent the consolidation of critical online infrastructure, but also in the various proposed antitrust reforms that would perpetuate the status quo.

#### Economism is founded on racist ideology that pollutes all of its methods and conclusions

Spriggs 20 William Spriggs, Ph.D. Professor in the Department of Economics, Howard University, Is now a teachable moment for economists? An open letter to economists from Bill Spriggs, <https://www.minneapolisfed.org/~/media/assets/people/william-spriggs/spriggs-letter_0609_b.pdf?la=en>

Modern economics has a deep and painful set of roots that too few economists acknowledge. The founding leadership of the American Economic Association deeply and fervently provided “scientific” succor to the American eugenicists’ movement. Their concept of race and human interaction was based on the “racial” superiority of White, Anglo-Saxon Protestants. And they launched modern economics with a definition of race that fully incorporated the assumed superiority of that group and bought into a notion of race as an exogenous variable. The overwhelming majority of explorations of racial disparities in economic outcomes remains deeply tied to that view of race as an exogenous variable. In the hands of far too many economists, it remains with the assumption that African Americans are inferior until proven otherwise. And, in this regard, it places economists alone outside the mainstream of all other American social sciences. It is the constant micro-aggression that African American economists endure at every meeting, and in reading every paper, and in reading every reviewer’s comments. Economists play a key role in shaping policy. We are viewed as the objective scientists, with the tools to identify solutions; presumably absent “passion.” But if you start with a model that has race as exogenous, racial differences cannot be objectively approached. The model begins with a fallacy that assumes racial differences as a natural order. It biases the model, because there is a built-in excuse for disparities that cannot be solved. And, invariably, in the overwhelming case of economic analysis, assumes that there is something “deficient” about Black people. Hopefully, more economists will accept the ugly reality that passively accepting that view leads to the ugly incidents of police misconduct we all observed. It is a form of “othering” that reduces the pain inflicted on someone because of decisions that are made. And it excuses the decision maker from responsibility at best or absolves them of guilt for the consequences at worst. Too many economists are great at excusing themselves when policies they propose exacerbate racial disadvantages because of that world view. Among the kinder economists, the “deficiency” in African Americans is caused by systemic policies that disadvantage Black people’s participation in the economy as equals. This requires real contortions, because it proclaims that there is a set of actors who have devised rules to prevent African Americans from adequate schooling (this is the primary claim), mostly through housing segregation and, depending on the economist, some learned or absorbed frustration on the part of African Americans that compounds their disadvantage. That is a difficult model to accept, because it means these actors who act with animus direct all their efforts at human capital accumulation but then act objectively in all of their other interactions with African Americans. I call this the two-bus theory because it requires busing out those negative actors and busing in new actors to make all other economic decisions on jobs and, in total contortion, home mortgage and home purchase decisions (since animus is accepted in creating residential segregation). Far too often, these same economists reject the modern social science theory of race as a social construct, designed to achieve and maximize outcomes for the benefit of those who created the racial definition, because those economists “fail to see where the agency is” for this. The inconsistency, of course, is that this contorted view accepts clear agency for the actions to segregate housing and create poor schooling. Another strain of economists are the “polite” economists who use “statistical discrimination” as a way to resolve what they perceive as an agency problem in how racism can affect economic outcomes. To Black economists, “statistical discrimination” is a constant micro-aggression. It is a model that makes no sense. How does a model assume that an entire set of actors, observing the infinite diversity of human beings, all settle on “race” as a meaningful marker independent of history, laws, and social norms? And, miraculously, those same “rational” actors use “statistical” methods to find only negative attributes highly correlated with “race.” The fact that far too many economists blindly agree that negative attributes correlate to being African American and cannot see that relationship to police officers assuming all Black men are criminals is stupefying. The fact that a discipline that prides itself on being objective and looking for data to test hypotheses fails to see how negative attributes do not correlate with being African American is a constant irritant for Black economists.

#### The alt is to reject the 1AC’s logic of economics---that’s key to open up new starting points to evaluate sociality

Miller 11 Miller, Ethan L., MS in Geography, University of Massachusetts Amherst, "Rethinking Economy for Regional Development: Ontology, Performativity, and Enabling Frameworks for Participatory Vision and Action" (2011). Retrieved from <https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses/630>

The basic premise of this thesis is that the stories we tell about the world make a difference. Rather than simply being descriptive accounts of an objective "reality," our concepts and theories play an active role in shaping the worlds that we live in. Ideas do not determine our worlds; nor do they fabricate them from nothing (it is not all a "language game"), but they can and do sometimes play a profound role in helping to bring them into being. What we think the world is made of, and how we think it all works, influences what we imagine, what we desire, and what we decide to make and do. Our concepts of "economy" and "economic development" are no exception. The current dynamics and institutions that constitute our economic lives are not written into the laws of nature; they are, rather, produced by specific historical processes in which our ideas about "the economy" have played a crucial role. This implies that the construction of different--more equitable, cooperative, democratic and ecologically-sound--economic relationships cannot simply be a matter of finding ways to cope differently with the overwhelming and demanding presence that we call "the economy." It must involve an interrogation of the very nature of this thing, our assumptions about what it is and how it works, and about the ways that these assumptions shape our sense of agency and possibility. As Gibson-Graham writes provocatively, "it is the way capitalism has been 'thought' that has made it so difficult for people to imagine its supersession" (2006a, 4). Theories of regional economic development, as I will argue in Chapter 1, have contributed to constructing a widely-shared set of assumptions about economic ontology (what "the economy" is and how it works)1 that channel energy and imagination into a constricted set of options for communities to pursue. Facing an apparently omnipresent, ever-demanding, weather-like (often "global") economy, people in regions around the world often feel forced to take actions in the name of necessary growth and competition that otherwise undermine their fundamental values: to create jobs, to increase income, to attract capital, to "win" in the "global marketplace," regions clearcut their forests, tear apart their mountains, drain their rivers, sell off public lands and resources, slash social programs and public-interest laws, lower minimum wages, or outsource all of these forms of violence to other regions in order to maintain an attractive, competitive "quality of life" for wealthy consumer-citizens. The seeming necessity of these dynamics--the sense of their inevitability--is produced, in significant part, by the way that economy has been "thought," by the ways in which discourses of regional economic development have constructed and successfully promoted a concept of economy and development that make such ethical trade-offs appear as part of the fabric of nature itself.

### 2

#### Interpretation: Every plank of the plan must in a vacuum be topical. That means every plank must increase prohibitions, because that is the ceiling of the resolution.

#### Violation: “expanding enforcement resources for…its core antitrust laws” does not increase prohibitions.

#### Their plan is written confusingly for a reason, you should think of it as three parts

The United States federal government should

* Expand enforcement resources for its core antitrust laws
* Expand the scope of its core antitrust laws
* Increase prohibitions on domestic export cartels that operate in foreign nations without protections for export cartels

#### The plan may make enforcement more effective, but does not increase prohibitions. If the plan text were only “expanding enforcement resources for…its core antitrust laws” it would universally lose on T-prohibit. That should apply equally in this case.

#### Increase means to make greater in size or number

Supreme Court of Kentucky 21 (Chief Justice MINTON decision in JEFFERSON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE v. Kentucky Retirement Systems, No. 2019-SC-0315-DG (Ky. June 17, 2021). Google Scholar Caselaw, date accessed 7/18/21)

Creditable compensation is defined under KRS 61.510, in the simplest terms for our purposes, as an employee's gross annual compensation, a numerical figure that typically appears on an employee's W-2 form each year.[6] But a related word increase was left undefined in its statutory context. So the meaning of the term increase under KRS 61.598 must derive its meaning implicitly from its context and legislative intent. We ascribe an ordinary meaning to the word.[7] Merriam-Webster defines increase as a verb, "to make greater in size, amount, or number," and as a noun, "something added (as by growth)."[8] Some common synonyms of the word include "augment, enlarge, or multiply."[9] Consistent with these definitions, the term increase appears to be used under KRS 61.698 to refer to an upward change in creditable compensation between fiscal years. In neither its ordinary use as a verb or noun do we find JCSO increased Duncan's pay or that the change between FY12 and FY13 constituted an increase. For KRS 61.598 to apply, there must be an increase in gross compensation, not merely a change.

#### Prohibit means forbid

Georgia Court of Appeals 64 (FRANKUM, Judge. Opinion in Andrews v. GEORGIA MUTUAL INS. CO., 137 S.E.2d 746, 110 Ga. App. 92 (Ct. App. 1964). Google scholar caselaw. Date accessed 7/13/21).

1. Chapter 56-24 of the present Insurance Code is applicable to all insurance policies. Code Ann. § 56-2402 provides: "`Policy' means the written contract of or written agreement for or effecting insurance, and includes all clauses, riders, endorsements and papers attached or issued and delivered for attachment thereto and a part thereof." Code Ann. § 56-2419 provides: "Every insurance contract shall be construed according to the entirety of its terms and conditions as set forth in the policy and as amplified, extended, or modified by any rider, endorsement, or application made a part of the policy." "`Insurance contracts are governed by the same rules of construction or interpretation, for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties, as apply to other contracts. Code § 56-815; Golden v. National Life & Accident Insurance Co., 189 Ga. 79 (2), 87 (5 SE2d 198, 125 ALR 838). Where the terms and conditions of an insurance policy are unambiguous, the court must declare the contract as made by the parties. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Marshall, 49 Ga. App. 287 (1) (175 SE 412). Where the meaning is plain and obvious, it should be treated as literally provided therein. Daniel v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co., 52 Ga. App. 620 (2) (184 SE 366).' Genone v. Citizens Ins. Co. of N. J., 207 Ga. 83, 86 (1) (60 SE2d 125)." Queen Ins. Co. v. Nalley Discount Co., 215 Ga. 837, 838 (1) (114 SE2d 21). Code Ann. § 56-3201 provides in part: "No policy of fire insurance covering property located in Georgia shall be made, issued or delivered unless it conforms as to all provisions and the sequence thereof with a standard or uniform form prescribed by the [Insurance] Commissioner, . . ." The plaintiff concedes that the standard form or fire policy prescribed by the Insurance Commissioner contains the clause 95\*95 quoted in the statement of facts, but contends that the provisions of the rider or endorsement attached to the policy sued upon with respect to the prohibition against other insurance is null and void and against public policy. We do not agree with this contention. The word "prohibit" means to "forbid by authority." 34 Words & Phrases 458, and cits. It would render meaningless the language contained in the standard policy to the effect that "other insurance may be prohibited by endorsement" to hold that such endorsement prohibiting other insurance could not carry with it the "authority" to enforce its provisions by providing for forfeiture of the policy for violations of such prohibition. The rider or endorsement which forms a part of the policy is not prohibited by law, is not in conflict with any provision required to be included in the policy, is unambiguous, and is a part of a binding contract between the parties to the policy. When the plaintiffs procured fire insurance from Cotton States Mutual Insurance Company in violation of the provisions of the policy sued upon, such action by the plaintiffs nullified and abrogated the policy in question.

#### **Anticompetitive practices are practices that restrict competition**

CTC 7 (Published by the Competition and Tariff Commission, “Zimbabwe: Introduction to Competition Law” , *AllAfrica,* 19 JULY 2007, <https://allafrica.com/stories/200707190109.html> , date accessed 9/4/21)

Restrictive business practices, also known as anti-competitive practices, refer to a wide range of business practices in which a firm or a group of firms may engage in order to restrict inter-firm competition so as to maintain or increase their relative market position and profits without necessarily providing goods or services at lower cost or of higher quality to the consumer.

#### They’ll say that “at least” justifies extra-topical action. But that mistakes floor and ceiling. The first half of the resolution requires that every element of the plan increase prohibitions. It doesn’t provide free reign for actions beyond prohibition, otherwise literally any action would be topical.

#### VOTE NEG:

#### FIRST---Plan spikes. Adding extra and non-topical planks moot core disads. Resource tradeoff, confirmation DAs, politics, and courts DAs --- all are nullified by 8 words in the plan. Topicality is the reciprocal cost to that benefit.

#### SECOND---Extraneous advantages. Non-topical planks produce unpredictable advantages. If you give a 2a an inch, they’ll take a mile. Assume the worst because they have no incentive to preserve neg victories.

### Resources Advantage

#### No correlation between food insecurity and social unrest

Vestby et al 18, \*Jonas, Doctoral Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, \*\*Ida Rudolfsen, doctoral researcher at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and PRIO, and \*\*\*Halvard Buhaug, Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO); Professor of Political Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU); and Associate Editor of the Journal of Peace Research and Political Geography. (5/18/18, “Does hunger cause conflict?”, *Climate & Conflict Blog*, <https://blogs.prio.org/ClimateAndConflict/2018/05/does-hunger-cause-conflict/>)

It is perhaps surprising, then, that there is little scholarly merit in the notion that a short-term reduction in access to food increases the probability that conflict will break out. This is because to start or participate in violent conflict requires people to have both the means and the will. Most people on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence, whether against the government or other social groups. In fact, the urban middle classes tend to be the most likely to protest against rises in food prices, since they often have the best opportunities, the most energy, and the best skills to coordinate and participate in protests.

Accordingly, there is a widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates primarily to food shortages. In reality, the sources of discontent are considerably more complex – linked to political structures, land ownership, corruption, the desire for democratic reforms and general economic problems – where the price of food is seen in the context of general increases in the cost of living. Research has shown that while the international media have a tendency to seek simple resource-related explanations – such as drought or famine – for conflicts in the Global South, debates in the local media are permeated by more complex political relationships.

#### No nuclear terrorism.

Ward 18, analyst on the Defence, Security, and Infrastructure team at RAND Europe. Citing Dr Beyza Unal, a research fellow in nuclear policy at think tank Chatham House. (Antonia, 7/27/18, "Is Nuclear Terrorism Distracting Attention from More Realistic Threats?", *RAND*, https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/07/is-the-threat-of-nuclear-terrorism-distracting-attention.html)

Despite Obama's remarks in 2016 and these two incidents, experts and officials contest the viability of the nuclear terrorism threat. Dr Beyza Unal, a research fellow in nuclear policy at think tank Chatham House, argued there is currently no evidence that terrorist groups could build a nuclear weapon. Similarly, a report by the Council on Foreign Relations in 2006 emphasized how building a nuclear bomb is a difficult task for states, let alone terrorists. This is because of the issues involved in accessing uranium and creating and maintaining it at the correct grade (enriched uranium).

While nuclear terrorism is a concern, the majority of terrorist attacks are conducted with conventional explosives. The 2017 Europol Terrorism Situation and Trend Report states that 40 percent of terrorist attacks used explosives. These explosives originate from a wide variety of countries across the world. According to a study by Conflict Armament Research, large quantities of explosive precursor chemicals used to make bombs as seen in the 7/7 attack in London in 2005 and the 2017 Manchester Arena attack, have been linked to supply chains in the United States, Europe, and Asia via Turkey. The threat from the spread of chemical precursors prompted the EU to begin looking at ways to tighten the regulations of these chemicals (PDF).

A nuclear terrorist attack would have grave consequences, but it is currently not a realistic or viable threat given that it would require a level of sophistication from terrorists that has not yet been witnessed. The recent focus of terrorist groups has been on simplistic strikes, such as knife and vehicular attacks. If countries are concerned about nuclear terrorism, the best way to mitigate this risk could be to tighten security at civilian and government nuclear sites. But governments would be better off focusing their efforts on combatting the spread and use of conventional weapons.

#### Oil Turn

#### Oil prices rebound now but Omicron puts it on the brink

**Rich 12/2** , A business journalist with over nine years of professional experience coupled with an economics background (Gillian, 12/2/2021, “Oil Prices Rise As OPEC+ Keeps Output Increase Steady, But Meeting Remains Open,” *Investor’s Business Daily*, <https://www.investors.com/news/oil-prices-rebound-opec-meeting-omicron-demand/> Date Accessed: 1/22/2022)

Oil prices rebounded modestly Thursday as OPEC+ continued with plans to increase production in January, despite the emergence of the omicron strain of the coronavirus and its uncertain impact on energy markets. OPEC+, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and nonmember partners including Russia, agreed to continue increasing production by 400,000 barrels per day next month. But in an unusual move OPEC+ didn't call the meeting to close and in its official communique said the meeting remains open "pending further developments of the pandemic." The group said it would "make immediate adjustments as required." U.S. crude oil futures rose 1.4% to $66.50 a barrel, rebounding from intraday losses. Exxon Mobil ([XOM](https://research.investors.com/quote.aspx?symbol=XOM)) rose 2.5% to 61.28 on the [stock market today](https://www.investors.com/market-trend/stock-market-today/stock-market-today-market-trends-best-stocks-buy-watch/). Dow Jones stock Chevron ([CVX](https://research.investors.com/quote.aspx?symbol=CVX)) climbed 2.7% to 115.14. EOG Resources ([EOG](https://research.investors.com/quote.aspx?symbol=EOG)) gained 1.4%. Pioneer Natural Resources ([PXD](https://research.investors.com/quote.aspx?symbol=PXD)) advanced 1.55% as Continental Resources ([CLR](https://research.investors.com/quote.aspx?symbol=CLR)) rebounded 2.8%. The OPEC+ meeting comes as the White House, along with the U.K., China, South Korea, India and Japan, release petroleum from strategic reserves as a part of a coordinated effort to tamp down rising oil prices. "By moving ahead with production increase in the face of a 20% decline in prices, OPEC+ has essentially taken the political pressure from the U.S. and other consuming nations off the table," wrote Rebecca Babin, senior energy trader at CIBC Private Wealth U.S., in an email. Oil Prices Volatile As Omicron Spurs Travel Bans Global oil demand remains uncertain due to the new omicron Covid-19 variant. On Wednesday, the U.S. was added to the growing list of countries verifying cases of the omicron variant, first identified in South Africa. Medical researchers so far have few specifics, but say the strain could be highly transmissible. Furthermore, the impact on individual patients is not clear and scientists remain uncertain regarding the effectiveness of current Covid-19 vaccines against the new strain. In response, the U.S., U.K., and EU have imposed travel bans on some African countries following the emergence of the new strain. The restrictions come just as travel, and oil demand, started picking up for the holiday season. Oil prices swung higher early Wednesday after the Energy Information Administration reported a 900,000 barrel drop in U.S. crude inventories and a 4 billion barrel increase in gasoline stockpiles. Analysts polled by S&P Global Platts expected a 2.7 million barrel decline in crude stockpiles and a 900,000 barrel increase in gasoline stockpiles.

#### Oil producers respond to renewables by ramping up oil production in the short term – that collapses prices and turns the aff – renewable tech will be delayed by short term spikes in cheap fossil fuel consumption

van der Ploeg ’15 (Frederick van der Ploeg – PhD @ the University of Cambridge, Professor of Economics at the University of Oxford, Research Director of the Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies. Ceeds Withagen. “Global Warming and the Green Paradox: A Review of Adverse Effects of Climate Policies,” 2015, *Oxford Review of Environmental Economics and Policy*)

The direction of growth and development is crucial for identifying the impacts of climate policy. A key objective of climate policy is to boost green innovation. Thus, policy makers need to focus on endogenous growth rather than exogenous technological developments. Otherwise, they may be forced to rely too much on slowing down the rate of economic growth to curb global warming. In this section, we discuss the impact of breakthrough technologies for renewable energy and the issue of using directed technical change to “kick-start” green innovation.

Effect of a Breakthrough Technology for Renewable Energy

Strand (2007) considers the effect of the sudden arrival of a breakthrough backstop technology that will render oil worthless at some yet uncertain moment in time. In this case, the oil profit margin grows at the market rate of interest plus the (exogenous) probability that oil becomes obsolete. Using linear demand functions, a marginal drop in the cost of the existing backstop brings forward the expected moment in time when oil extraction ceases. Furthermore, it increases total expected extraction of fossil fuel, thus increasing total cumulative carbon emissions. The higher the probability that the new technology will arrive, the faster oil extraction will take place, which is akin to the Green Paradox effect.

Van der Ploeg (2012) also examines the effects of a pending breakthrough in renewable energy, but allows for monopolistic resource owners to invest in the exploration of new fossil fuel reserves. In this case, what matters for efficiency is not whether a carbon-free substitute will arrive but rather the uncertainty about when the breakthrough substitute will arrive on the market. In this scenario, reserves are depleted too rapidly before the carbon-free substitute has come to the market. Subsidizing R&D to accelerate the introduction of breakthrough renewable technologies will also accelerate oil extraction before the breakthrough occurs, which is a manifestation of the weak Green Paradox. However, more oil will be left in the ground because investment in exploration will be lower. This latter effect curbs cumulative CO2 emissions and thus reduces global warming.

Winter (2013) also examines the impact of a breakthrough technology for renewable energy, but allows for stock-dependent extraction cost of fossil fuel, which has an effect that is similar to endogenous exploration investment. He finds that prior to the arrival of the breakthrough technology there is more oil extraction than when there is no possibility of innovation. If innovation is possible but does not occur before oil extraction stops, oil extraction is always higher and oil extraction ceases earlier. If the breakthrough discovery is made before oil extraction stops, oil extraction is also higher, but it stops earlier and more oil reserves remain untapped. Global warming will be curbed if the fall in cumulative emissions outweighs the short-run increase in emissions that is due to the accelerated oil extraction (that results from the fear of oil reserves becoming worthless at some time in the future). In this case, the weak Green Paradox is merely a short-run nuisance. Winter (2013) warns that there is a danger that the increased carbon emissions resulting from short-run weak Green Paradox effects may unleash positive feedback effects in the CO2 cycle (e.g., release of methane from ocean floors). To the extent that these feedback effects are irreversible, subsidizing breakthrough, carbon-free energy sources has potentially disastrous welfare effects.

Strategic Interactions: Blocking Renewable Energy

Thus far, we have not considered the impact of conflicting interests on climate policy. However, in the real world, strategic interactions between oil exporters (who must decide how fast to extract their finite reserves in the face of the risk that if they wait too long their reserves may become economically obsolete due to the arrival of abundant carbon-free substitutes) and oil importers (who are trying to reduce their oil dependence by investing in the development of alternatives) may be important. Gerlagh and Liski (2011) examine these strategic interactions and find that fossil fuel producers try to delay the introduction of the renewable energy substitute by supplying more oil to the market, thus lowering the oil price. This weakens the incentives to develop the perfect substitute for fossil fuel, especially if the required investments are costly and take time to develop. Effectively, buyers are compensated for postponing the introduction of the renewable energy substitute.

#### Insufficient price rebound causes economic collapse and instability in Middle East and Russia

Dettmer 20, citing Julien Barnes-Dacey, European Council on Foreign Relations and David Jalilvand, managing director of Berlin-based Orient Matters (Jamie, “Plunge in Oil Prices Could Shake Up Middle East, Russia ,” *VoA*, <https://www.voanews.com/economy-business/plunge-oil-prices-could-shake-middle-east-russia>)

The collapse in oil prices has created a bleak outlook for a number of companies and also could lead to dire political consequences for governments in the Middle East and Russia, whose budgets are already strained and who depend on fossil fuel revenue, say Western diplomats and political analysts. If oil prices do not recover soon, analysts warn, even strong central powers risk destabilization. The drop in prices comes at a difficult time for many governments in the Middle East. According to Julien Barnes-Dacey of the European Council on Foreign Relations, the coronavirus is “just one crisis on top of multiple crises — economic, political, conflict — and it raises the question: ‘Is this just one other element that pushes the region over the edge,’ particularly if you put it beside the collapse in oil prices, which has gutted the finances of Saudi Arabia and Iraq.” Their one hope is that economic recovery is swift after the pandemic ends and demand for oil mounts quickly, outstripping supply and sending prices soaring. But working through the stockpiles will take time, and demand will likely be subdued as the world works through a global recession. “Demand will remain subdued for an extended period,” the independent Rystad Energy said. “The price plunge will result in a huge loss of revenue for oil and gas producers,” said David Jalilvand, managing director of Berlin-based Orient Matters. “Most of them have already been accumulating fiscal deficits, which are now set to widen substantially,” he noted in an online commentary before oil prices turned negative. The collapse will add to “a significant economic deterioration right across the Middle East and may well aggravate already mounting geopolitical tensions in the Gulf,” Jalilvand warned. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may be able to tap into cash reserves and borrow from international capital markets to cushion the blow in the short term, but others, like Iran, already squeezed by U.S. sanctions, and Iraq, won’t have that option, he added. Iraq and Iran Oil revenue generated around 95% of the Iraqi government’s budget last year. A budgetary crisis will make it difficult for it to pay the salaries of public servants and the army, as well as Shi’ite militias. It will also compound the difficulties Iraq was having in providing basic public services such as power and health care, analysts say. Even before the coronavirus appeared, the country was immersed in political crisis. Cuts in social spending will only aggravate political stability. Iran’s gross domestic product contracted last year by around 9.5%, and runaway inflation of 35% has eroded the purchasing power of ordinary Iranians. While only 30% of the government’s budget comes from oil revenue, Tehran has little financial room to maneuver and will also have difficulty paying for social spending — risking further unrest in a country that has experienced rising public anger. Saudi Arabia Other Middle East countries could see major political ramifications, including Saudi Arabia, where Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is looking to consolidate his hold on power. The preeminent Gulf kingdom has a widening fiscal deficit and shrinking reserves, and Salman’s plans for economic transformation risk being upended by budget cuts, as government revenue falls because of the pandemic and plummeting energy prices. In recent months, there has been mounting behind-the-scenes criticism of Salman from members of the royal family who have been marginalized in his rise to power. Last month, there were unconfirmed reports that Salman thwarted an attempted palace coup. Russia Russia also faces high political risks. The price plunge is “sapping the lifeblood of the Russian economy practically overnight,” said Eugene Rumer, a former U.S. national intelligence officer who is now a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Russian newspaper Vedomosti reported Tuesday that a barrel of Russia’s Urals oil was trading at $8.48 a barrel, the lowest price since 1998. Two-thirds of Russia’s export earnings and 40% of its budget revenue is generated by oil sales. The Ministry of Finance announced earlier this year that Russia’s finances can withstand prices as low as $25 a barrel for up to 10 years by drawing on a $150 billion National Wealth Fund to compensate for shortfalls in the government’s budget. Some observers suspect this is an over-optimistic assessment and doesn’t consider the promises Putin made earlier this year in his annual State of the Union address to raise living standards, which have stagnated for the past half-decade. “The current budget is calculated at an oil price of $42 per barrel, and that, combined with foreign currency reserves of $570 billion, could indeed provide a cushion — but only in the short term,” said Margarita Assenova of the Jamestown Foundation. In the past few months before the coronavirus appeared, discontent appeared to be mounting across the country, with an increase in protests over living conditions. “It is becoming increasingly clear that if oil prices do not recover, President Vladimir Putin is unlikely to deliver on his promise to increase social spending,” Assenova said. And that will not help the Russian leader “secure his position as de facto president for life” after starting changes to the Russian constitution.

#### Middle East war escalates. Turns environment.

Lantier 19, PhD @ Geneva (Alex, “Syrian army, Iran threaten counterattack against Turkish invasion of Syria,” <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2019/10/14/syri-o14.html>)

The conflicts erupting between the different capitalist regimes in the Middle East pose an imminent threat not only to the population of the region, but to the entire world. Workers can give no support to any of the competing military plans and strategic appetites of these reactionary regimes. With America, Europe, Russia and China all deeply involved in the proxy war in Syria, a large-scale Middle East war could strangle the world oil supply and escalate into war between nuclear-armed powers. The working class is coming face to face with the real possibility of a Third World War.

#### Russia economic decline causes global war---collapses NATO and EU, global separatism, terrorism and populism

Kaplan 16 (Robert; is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security; “Eurasia’s Coming Anarchy”; *Foreign Affairs*; <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-02-15/eurasias-coming-anarchy>; accessed 9/24/19; MSCOTT)

Back in the 1980s, when that economy was hit by a crisis, Mikhail Gorbachev responded by opening up the political system—only to be rewarded with anarchy and the collapse of Russia’s empire. Putin learned this lesson well and is determined to do the opposite: keep the political system closed while distracting the masses with displays of Russian power in the near abroad. Putin is a former intelligence agent, not a former apparatchik. Thus, although he nurses historical grudges concerning Russia’s place in the world, he is not deceiving himself about Russia’s internal problems. As the Russian economy decays further, Putin surely knows that for the sake of domestic approval, his foreign policy must become more creative and calculating, even deceptively conciliatory at moments. Over time, expect him to find new ways to undermine NATO and the EU, even as he claims to be helping the West fight the Islamic State, or ISIS. For the more chaos he can generate abroad, the more valuable the autocratic stability he provides at home will appear. Russians may know in the abstract that a freer society is preferable, but they fear the risks of such a transition.

Try as he might, however, Putin will not be able to shelter his regime from the fallout of economic collapse. Desperation will spawn infighting among a ruling elite that has grown used to sharing generous spoils. Given the absence of strong institutions, as well as the brittle and highly centralized nature of the regime, a coup like the one that toppled Nikita Khrushchev in 1964 cannot be ruled out; Russia remains Soviet in its style of governance. The country has experienced the crumbling of autocracy followed by chaos before (as during and after the 1917 revolutions), and it’s possible that enough turmoil could cause Russia to fragment yet again. The heavily Muslim North Caucasus, along with areas of Russia’s Siberian and Far Eastern districts, distant from the center and burdened by bloody politics, may begin loosening their ties to Moscow in the event of instability inside the Kremlin itself. The result could be Yugoslavia lite: violence and separatism that begin in one place and spread elsewhere. As Moscow loses control, the global jihadist movement could take advantage of the vacuum and come to Russia’s outlying regions and to Central Asia.

Bad as this sounds, things could still get worse. Back in 1991, the Polish intellectual Adam Michnik predicted that future leaders in Russia and eastern Europe would fill the gap left by the collapse of communism with “a coarse and primitive nationalism.” Putin has adopted just such a nationalism in recent years. He has slyly backed separatist movements in Abkhazia, the Donbas, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Transnistria, creating deniable conflicts that result in warlord-run statelets. In the years ahead, he may well choose to provoke more of these so-called frozen conflicts, but this time in NATO Baltic member states (which have sizable Russian populations and which Moscow still considers lost provinces). Meanwhile, Putin will try to play on Europe’s need for Russian support in Syria to force Europe to acknowledge his annexation of Crimea and his de facto rule over eastern Ukraine.

But just when a firm response is most needed, Europe is looking less and less likely to be able to provide one. In some ways, Russia’s current crisis parallels that of Europe, which is also dividing into core and peripheral areas. Despite adjustments by the European Central Bank and other measures, a time of slow global growth, coupled with Europe’s inability to make fundamental reforms, means that the European political and economic crisis will persist. By frightening states into resolidifying their borders, the migrant and terrorism crises will also exacerbate the EU’s divisions—and, inevitably, NATO’s as well.

Such disunity will make Europe’s attempts to confront Russia even more hesitant and disorganized than they are today. As NATO weakens, the former Warsaw Pact states will increasingly look to the United States for their security. They will also divide into subgroups: already, Poland, the Baltic countries, and Scandinavia are forming an alliance of sorts to withstand Russian aggression, and the Visegrad Group—which includes the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia—is becoming more concrete in terms of its political and military consultation. Further sowing division is Nord Stream 2, a proposed second pipeline through the Baltic Sea that would allow Russia to bypass central and eastern Europe when sending gas to western Europe. In all these countries, slow economic growth will intensify right-wing and left-wing nationalist movements, which prey on unmet economic expectations.

#### No impact to warming

Kerr 19 (Dr. Amber Kerr, Energy and Resources PhD at the University of California-Berkeley, known agroecologist, former coordinator of the USDA California Climate Hub. Dr. Daniel Swain, Climate Science PhD at UCLA, climate scientist, a research fellow at the National Center for Atmospheric Research. Dr. Andrew King, Earth Sciences PhD, Climate Extremes Research Fellow at the University of Melbourne. Dr. Peter Kalmus, Physics PhD at the University of Colombia, climate scientist at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab. Professor Richard Betts, Chair in Climate Impacts at the University of Exeter, a lead author on the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in Working Group 1. Dr. William Huiskamp, Paleoclimatology PhD at the Climate Change Research Center, climate scientist at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. (Amber, “Claim that human civilization could end in 30 years is speculative, not supported with evidence,” series of posts from scientists compiled by editor Scott Johnson, *Climate Feedback*, <https://climatefeedback.org/evaluation/iflscience-story-on-speculative-report-provides-little-scientific-context-james-felton/>)

Scientists who reviewed IFLScience’s story found that it failed to provide sufficient context for this report—differentiating, for example, between speculative claims and descriptions of peer-reviewed research. In particular, the story’s headline (“New Report Warns ‘High Likelihood Of Human Civilization Coming To An End’ Within 30 Years”) misrepresents the report as a likely projection rather than an exploration of an intrinsically unlikely worst case scenario.

See all the scientists’ annotations in context.

REVIEWERS’ OVERALL FEEDBACK

These comments are the overall assessment of scientists on the article, they are substantiated by their knowledge in the field and by the content of the analysis in the annotations on the article.

Amber Kerr, Researcher, Agricultural Sustainability Institute, University of California, Davis:

The content of the IFLScience article is mostly an accurate representation of the contents of the Breakthrough report, but the article tends to gloss over important caveats and probabilities that are given in the report. The least accurate part of the IFLScience article is the headline, which is an outright misrepresentation of the report. The article title states that there is, overall, a “high probability” of human civilization coming to an end in 30 years. This is extremely misleading. What the Breakthrough report actually says is that, in the most unlikely, “long-tail” biophysical scenario where climate feedbacks are much more severe than we expect, THEN there is a high likelihood of human civilization coming to an end. But the report authors explicitly state that this “high-end scenario” is beyond their capacity to model or to quantitatively estimate.

Daniel Swain, Researcher, UCLA, and Research Fellow, National Center for Atmospheric Research:

The article uncritically reproduces claims from a recent report released by an Australian thinktank regarding the purported “end of human civilization” due to climate change over the next 30 years. While there is plenty of scientific evidence that climate change will pose increasingly existential threats to the most vulnerable individuals in society and to key global ecosystems, even these dire outcomes aren’t equivalent to the “annihilation of intelligent life,” as is claimed in the report.

Andrew King, Research fellow, University of Melbourne:

The report this article is based on describes a scenario which is unlikely, but several aspects of what is included in the report are likely to worsen in coming decades, such as the occurrence of deadly heatwaves. The conclusion of a high likelihood that human civilisation will end is false, although there is a great deal of evidence that there will be many damaging consequences to continued global warming over the coming decades.

Peter Kalmus, Data Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory:

I don’t think it’s so easy to discount the essential warning of this report. However, it would have been stronger if the authors were more careful not to mention the unsupported concept of near-term human extinction, and the unsupported probabilistic claim that there is a “high likelihood” of their 2050 scenario which includes the collapse of civilization. I do not understand why non-scientist writers (neither report author is a scientist) feel a need to exaggerate sound scientific findings, when those findings are already quite alarming enough. I feel that humanity should undertake urgent climate action just as the report authors do, but I feel that misrepresenting the science is unhelpful and unnecessary.

Richard Betts, Professor, Met Office Hadley Centre & University of Exeter:

This is a classic case of a media article over-stating the conclusions and significance of a non-peer reviewed report that itself had already overstated (and indeed misrepresented) peer-reviewed science – some of which was already somewhat controversial. It appears that there was not a thorough independent check of the credibility of the message.

Notes:

[1] See the rating guidelines used for article evaluations.

[2] Each evaluation is independent. Scientists’ comments are all published at the same time.

ANNOTATIONS

The statements quoted below are from the article; comments are from the reviewers (and are lightly edited for clarity).

New Report Warns “High Likelihood Of Human Civilization Coming To An End” Within 30 Years

Richard Betts, Professor, Met Office Hadley Centre & University of Exeter:

The headline overstates the conclusions of the report (which is already overdoing things). The reports says it presents a scenario, and under that scenario and all the assumptions within it, the report claims that there is a “high likelihood of human civilization coming to and end” – but even then, the report itself does not give the end of civilisation within 30 years. The process supposedly leading ultimately to collapse begins around 2050 but takes a long time to take effect. Also the processes themselves are not well-grounded in science, as they over-interpret published work.

A new report has warned there’s an existential risk to humanity from the climate crisis within the coming decades, and a ‘high likelihood of human civilization coming to an end’ over the next three decades unless urgent action is taken.

Andrew King, Research fellow, University of Melbourne:

This is hyperbole. The scenario constructed in this report does not have a “high likelihood” of occurring in part because it requires a confluence of circumstances coming together. While it’s certainly true that climate change will be damaging to society and the environment and many of the consequences will be severe this does not equate to a high likelihood of civilisation coming to an end.

Richard Betts, Professor, Met Office Hadley Centre & University of Exeter:

The “report” is not a peer-reviewed scientific paper. It’s from some sort of “think tank” who can basically write what they like. The report itself misunderstands / misrepresents science, and does not provide traceable links to the science it is based on so it cannot easily be checked (although someone familiar with the literature can work it out, and hence see where the report’s conclusions are ramped-up from the original research).

This requires us to work towards avoiding catastrophic possibilities rather than looking at probabilities, as learning from mistakes is not an option when it comes to existential risks.

Andrew King, Research fellow, University of Melbourne:

The report focuses on possible scenarios very much on the extreme end of what could happen but then claims there’s a “high likelihood” of human civilisation ending. These two statements don’t fit together.

With that in mind, they propose a plausible and terrifying “2050 scenario” whereby humanity could face irreversible collapse in just three decades.

Peter Kalmus, Data Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory:

Not to downplay the seriousness of what humanity is facing, but the report in fact doesn’t make this claim. While scientists do expect many of the changes to the Earth system due to global heating to be “irreversible,” and while this should be extremely concerning to any reasonable person, it is different than “irreversible human collapse” which, if you think about it, needs unpacking.

Their analysis calculates the existential climate-related security risk to Earth through a scenario set 30 years into the future.

Richard Betts, Professor, Met Office Hadley Centre & University of Exeter:

No, the report’s authors have merely read (or possibly seen without actually reading) a few of the scariest papers they could find, misunderstood (or not read properly) at least one of them, and presented unjustified statements.

posing permanent large negative consequences to h

umanity that may never be undone, either annihilating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtailing its potential.

Daniel Swain, Researcher, UCLA, and Research Fellow, National Center for Atmospheric Research:

As I climate scientist, I am unaware of any scientific research that suggests changes in Earth’s climate capable of “annihilating intelligent life” over the next 30 years.

There is plenty of evidence that climate change will pose increasingly existential threats to the most vulnerable individuals in society; to low-lying coastal cities and island nations; to indigenous cultures and ways of life; and to numerous plant and animal species, and perhaps even entire ecosystems.

Such consequences are well-supported by the existing evidence, are already starting to emerge in certain regions, and should be of paramount concern. But even these very dire outcomes aren’t equivalent to the “end of human civilization,” as is claimed in the report.

Peter Kalmus, Data Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory:

There is no scientific basis to suggest that climate breakdown will “annihilate intelligent life” (by which I assume the report authors mean human extinction) by 2050.

However, climate breakdown does pose a grave threat to civilization as we know it, and the potential for mass suffering on a scale perhaps never before encountered by humankind. This should be enough reason for action without any need for exaggeration or misrepresentation!

A “Hothouse Earth” scenario plays out that sees Earth’s temperatures doomed to rise by a further 1°C (1.8°F) even if we stopped emissions immediately.

Peter Kalmus, Data Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory:

This word choice perhaps reveals a bias on the part of the author of the article. A temperature can’t be doomed. And while I certainly do not encourage false optimism, assuming that humanity is doomed is lazy and counterproductive.

Fifty-five percent of the global population are subject to more than 20 days a year of lethal heat conditions beyond that which humans can survive

Richard Betts, Professor, Met Office Hadley Centre & University of Exeter:

This is clearly from Mora et al (2017) although the report does not include a citation of the paper as the source of that statement. The way it is written here (and in the report) is misleading because it gives the impression that everyone dies in those conditions. That is not actually how Mora et al define “deadly heat” – they merely looked for heatwaves when somebody died (not everybody) and then used that as the definition of a “deadly” heatwave.

North America suffers extreme weather events including wildfires, drought, and heatwaves. Monsoons in China fail, the great rivers of Asia virtually dry up, and rainfall in central America falls by half.

Andrew King, Research fellow, University of Melbourne:

Projections of extreme events such as these are very difficult to make and vary greatly between different climate models.

Deadly heat conditions across West Africa persist for over 100 days a year

Peter Kalmus, Data Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory:

The deadly heat projections (this, and the one from the previous paragraph) come from Mora et al (2017)1.

It should be clarified that “deadly heat” here means heat and humidity beyond a two-dimension threshold where at least one person in the region subject to that heat and humidity dies (i.e., not everyone instantly dies). That said, in my opinion, the projections in Mora et al are conservative and the methods of Mora et al are sound. I did not check the claims in this report against Mora et al but I have no reason to think they are in error.

1- Mora et al (2017) Global risk of deadly heat, Nature Climate Change

The knock-on consequences affect national security, as the scale of the challenges involved, such as pandemic disease outbreaks, are overwhelming. Armed conflicts over resources may become a reality, and have the potential to escalate into nuclear war. In the worst case scenario, a scale of destruction the authors say is beyond their capacity to model, there is a ‘high likelihood of human civilization coming to an end’.

Willem Huiskamp, Postdoctoral research fellow, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research:

This is a highly questionable conclusion. The reference provided in the report is for the “Global Catastrophic Risks 2018” report from the “Global Challenges Foundation” and not peer-reviewed literature. (It is worth noting that this latter report also provides no peer-reviewed evidence to support this claim).

Furthermore, if it is apparently beyond our capability to model these impacts, how can they assign a ‘high likelihood’ to this outcome?

While it is true that warming of this magnitude would be catastrophic, making claims such as this without evidence serves only to undermine the trust the public will have in the science.

Daniel Swain, Researcher, UCLA, and Research Fellow, National Center for Atmospheric Research:

It seems that the eye-catching headline-level claims in the report stem almost entirely from these knock-on effects, which the authors themselves admit are “beyond their capacity to model.” Thus, from a scientific perspective, the purported “high likelihood of civilization coming to an end by 2050” is essentially personal speculation on the part of the report’s authors, rather than a clear conclusion drawn from rigorous assessment of the available evidence.

Richard Betts, Professor, Met Office Hadley Centre & University of Exeter:

So there is only a “high likelihood” in the scenario that the report’s authors have constructed here. They do not say that their scenario itself is “highly likely” (in fact they say it is a “sketch”) – so the headline of this article is not justified.

The most recent IPCC report lays out a future if we limit global heating to 1.5°C instead of the Paris Agreement’s 2°C.

Peter Kalmus, Data Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory:

The article doesn’t mention it, but it’s worth pointing out that the underlying report criticizes the IPCC for being too “reticent” and gives an erroneous example: it claims that mean global temperatures will accelerate beyond the IPCC’s projections since human greenhouse gas emissions are themselves accelerating. Emissions ARE accelerating exponentially, leading to exponential CO2 atmospheric fraction increase, but exponential growth in CO2 fraction leads to linearly increasing global mean temperature.

By 2050 there’s a scientific consensus that we reached the tipping point for ice sheets in Greenland and the West Antarctic well before 2°C (3.6°F) of warming

Richard Betts, Professor, Met Office Hadley Centre & University of Exeter:

This is somewhat unclear phrasing from the report. Although studies have shown it is possible that the threshold for the Greenland Ice Sheet tipping point may be lower than 2C global warming (relative to pre-industrial), there is not currently a scientific consensus that this is where the threshold is. It seems to authors’ scenario is that scientists living in 2050 have reached the consensus that the tipping point has been passed by that time, but that’s different – again it’s part of the scenario and does not support the “end of civilisation by 2050” headline.

#### Reforestation now---solves warming without limiting fossil fuels

Charles 19 (Dan, “You May Be Surprised To Learn Which 2 Countries Are Making The Globe A Lot Greener,” NPR, <https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2019/02/14/694202210/you-may-be-surprised-to-learn-which-two-countries-are-making-the-globe-a-lot-gre>)

The world is getting greener. That's according to Chi Chen, a doctoral student in the Department of Earth and Environment at Boston University. Chen has been mining data collected by an orbiting NASA camera that monitors green vegetation on Earth's surface, day by day. This week, Chen and his colleagues published a new study showing that the amount of our planet's land surface covered by green leaves increased between 2000 and 2017. The extent of the global greening is bigger than previously measured using other, less precise instruments. Even more interesting: Chen was able to pinpoint the causes of increasing — or decreasing — leaf cover in particular areas. In some places, changes in leaf cover apparently resulted from weather and climate change. The growing season is getting longer in some temperate areas, and rising carbon dioxide levels may be producing bigger, leafier plants. One large area of Brazil lost vegetation. "I personally checked the data, and that's because of drought," Chen says. The most striking changes, though, were the result of human decisions in China and India. Both countries have been getting a lot greener. Article continues after sponsor message Molly Brown, a geographer at the University of Maryland, has seen this greening up close. "These are really good examples of how policy can really make a difference," she says. The greening of India, Brown says, comes from a huge expansion of irrigated agriculture: "Instead of having just crops when it's raining, they also have a whole six months of cropping and greenness when it's not raining." This version of greening isn't really so great for the environment, though. The irrigation drains groundwater, vegetation is wiped away at harvest time and the extra fertilizer farmers use releases greenhouse gases. In China, though, about half of the new leaf cover that Chen detected appears to be the result of a massive reforestation effort. It's a government-sponsored attempt to prevent catastrophic dust storms that resulted from earlier deforestation. The Good News (And Not So Good News) About China's Smoggy Air GOATS AND SODA The Good News (And Not So Good News) About China's Smoggy Air "They are really doing a good job," Brown says. They have a large and comprehensive program of tree growing, tree planting, tree maintenance." Those trees likely will stay in place, capturing dust and also carbon dioxide, the greenhouse gas. They'll store that carbon in wood and roots and soil, doing their part to slow global warming.

### Outreach Advantage

#### No modelling---dozens of past violations destroys any US credibility

ABA 16, American Bar Association. (2-10-2016, “The United States and Human Rights Treaties: Can We Meet Our Commitments?”, <https://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/2015--vol--41-/vol--41--no--2---human-rights-at-home/the-united-states-and-human-rights-treaties--can-we-meet-our-com/>)

Despite these deficiencies, the United States thinks too highly of itself to treat international human rights law—at least when applied to us—as law. We ratify few human rights treaties. We attach multiple conditions (called “reservations, understandings, and declarations”) to those we do ratify. We declare even those treaties “not self-executing,” which renders them generally unenforceable in our courts (although they can still be used as interpretive guides for U.S. laws). And we decline to accept individual complaint procedures or clauses referring disputes under the treaties to the International Court of Justice. That said, a trio of treaties ratified during the terms of the first President Bush and President Clinton commit the United States internationally to respect and protect a wide range of human rights. Two decades later, however, Washington is unwilling or unable to live up to key promises it made under those treaties, at least in the view of the committees of international experts set up to oversee them. The three treaties are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), both joined by the United States in 1992; and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), joined by the United States in 1994. (We have ratified other human rights treaties on specific topics, such as the Genocide Convention and Protocols on child soldiers and child trafficking.) Civil and Political Covenant The ICCPR requires each of its 168 state parties “to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction” a menu of civil and political rights, without discrimination. For example, the ICCPR protects the rights to life, liberty, humane treatment, fair trial, and privacy. States must also ensure that victims of violations have an effective remedy. In grave public emergencies, certain ICCPR rights, including liberty and due process—but not freedom from torture—may be restricted. However, both the emergency and the restrictions (called “derogations”) must be formally notified to the UN. The restrictions must also be limited to the extent and duration strictly required. The United States has never derogated from the ICCPR. Convention against Race Discrimination CERD’s 177 state parties are barred from allowing distinctions based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin, whose “purpose or effect” is to nullify or impair the equal exercise of human rights. Parties undertake to pursue a policy to eliminate racial discrimination. They must ensure equal treatment with respect to a broad range of rights, such as the right to vote and the right to security against police violence. Victims of violations must have effective remedies, including “just and adequate reparation.” Affirmative action—within limits—is encouraged. CERD authorizes “special measures” for the purpose of securing “adequate advancement” of certain racial groups, so long as the measures do not lead to the “maintenance of separate rights” and do not continue after their goals are achieved. The CERD expert committee (see below) interprets this as an “obligation” to adopt special measures when warranted to eliminate “persistent” racial disparities. Convention against Torture CAT categorically prohibits torture: “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.” Each of CAT’s 158 state parties is mandated to take effective measures to prevent, punish, and redress torture. Treaty Reporting and Expert Committees All three treaties require state parties to submit periodic reports on compliance to committees of experts. The committees also receive “shadow reports” from nongovernmental groups—from scores of groups in the case of the United States. After public hearings in which committee members question and dialogue with government delegations, the committees issue “concluding observations” and ask that follow-up reports be submitted one year later. The committees have long had distinguished U.S. members. The current U.S. member of the Human Rights Committee, which oversees the ICCPR, is Professor Sarah Cleveland of Columbia Law School. The U.S. member of the CERD committee is Professor Carlos Vázquez of Georgetown Law, and of the CAT committee, Felice Gaer, director of the Jacob Blaustein Institute. CAT committee chair Claudio Grossman, the Chilean member, is dean of Washington College of Law at American University. Treaty Norms vs. U.S. Norms In 2014, all three committees issued concluding observations on U.S. reports. They began by commending positive steps taken by the United States since the previous round of reporting, such as the Supreme Court decision in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), ruling the juvenile death penalty unconstitutional; President Obama’s 2009 executive order prohibiting torture; his ongoing efforts to close Guantanamo; and the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act, which reduced racial sentencing disparities for crack cocaine versus powdered cocaine. Each committee then elaborated its “concerns.” From a U.S. perspective, one might group them in three broad categories: (1) U.S. rejection of treaty norms for reasons that many U.S. human rights lawyers would applaud; (2) U.S. rejection of treaty norms for reasons deeply embedded in U.S. legal and political culture; and (3) U.S. violations of treaty norms, even where they are consistent with American culture and values. In the first category—laudable U.S. departures—one might place overbroad bans on hate speech. CERD requires criminalization of “all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred.” The ICCPR bans all “advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.” The United States adopted reservations to these provisions on First Amendment grounds. Nonetheless the CERD committee urges the United States to consider criminalizing racist hate speech, even when it does not incite imminent violence or “true threats” of violence. Many U.S. human rights lawyers would support the U.S. position to allow hate speech that falls short of such incitement. In the second category—norms incompatible with embedded U.S. culture—one might place the Human Rights Committee’s call for the United States to consider acceding to an Optional Protocol to the ICCPR abolishing the death penalty. Another candidate might be the CERD committee’s call for the United States to redefine racial discrimination across the board in order to meet CERD’s “purpose or effect” definition. The Supreme Court has held that the test for violating constitutionally mandated equal protection of the law is a purpose test, not an effects test. While some U.S. laws use a “disproportionate impact” test, most do not. U.S. law is unlikely to move toward an “effects” test anytime soon. This reality neutralizes many CERD committee recommendations to the United States. CERD committee concerns rest on disproportionate impact in such areas as denial of voting rights to convicted felons, gun violence, aspects of criminal justice and juvenile justice, and inadequate legal aid. While there are serious racial gaps in all these areas, and CERD may help focus attention by placing them under an international spotlight, the United States is more likely to treat them as policy problems than as unlawful discrimination. On the other hand, CERD concerns about disparate racial impacts in housing—resulting from urban environmental pollution, criminalization of homelessness, and mortgage-lending practices and foreclosures—may prove to be in sync with the “disparate impact” test under the U.S. Fair Housing Act as recently interpreted by the Supreme Court in Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). Fair housing may thus potentially fit within the third category of issues, where human rights treaties are consistent with both U.S. national values and our legal culture. In these areas, Washington should live up to our international commitments without delay. The following are illustrative: Torture and Accountability CAT requires the United States to: prevent torture “in any territory under its jurisdiction”; criminalize all acts of torture; make these offenses punishable by penalties that “take into account their grave nature”; establish jurisdiction over torture by U.S. nationals; ensure a “prompt and impartial investigation, wherever there is reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been committed in any territory under its jurisdiction”; ensure that victims of torture obtain redress and fair and adequate compensation; and refrain from sending someone to a country if there are “substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” Since 2001, the United States has violated all these treaty commitments. In December 2014, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released a 500-page executive summary of its report on CIA detention and interrogation. In a foreword, Committee Chair Dianne Feinstein expressed her “personal conclusion that, under any common meaning of the term, CIA detainees were tortured.” She was correct. The Committee found, for example: “Sleep deprivation involved keeping detainees awake for up to 180 hours, usually standing or in stress positions, at times with their hands shackled over their heads. At least five detainees experienced disturbing hallucinations . . . .” “The waterboarding technique was physically harmful, inducing convulsions and vomiting.” One detainee “became ‘completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth.’ Internal CIA records describe the waterboarding of [another prisoner] as . . . a ‘series of near drownings.’” Techniques such as slamming detainees against a wall were used “with significant repetition for days or weeks at a time” “in combination, frequently concurrent with sleep deprivation and nudity.” One detention facility was a “dungeon,” the chief CIA interrogator said. Detainees were “in complete darkness and constantly shackled in isolated cells with loud noise or music and only a bucket to use for human waste. Lack of heat . . . likely contributed to [a detainee’s] death.” The Committee also found that the CIA repeatedly misled the Justice Department about interrogation techniques and confinement conditions. The CIA’s “inaccurate and incomplete” information impeded effective oversight by the White House and Congress. CIA misinformation “complicated, and in some cases impeded” the national security work of the FBI, Director of National Intelligence, and State Department. Against this backdrop, the United States should heed the recommendations of the CAT committee. The first set of recommendations concerns inadequate legislation. The U.S. Code criminalizes torture abroad but not in the United States. The CAT committee “regrets that the specific offense of torture has not yet been introduced at the federal level.” Even where torture is a crime, the committee “regrets” that the United States restrictively interprets CAT by narrowing the definition of “mental harm” that can qualify as torture (although the Senate Committee findings reveal that the CIA tortured even by that narrower definition). Legislation is critical. The CAT committee welcomed the United States’ “unequivocal commitment to abide by the universal prohibition of torture and ill-treatment everywhere,” as well as U.S. assurances that its personnel are legally barred from committing torture and ill-treatment “at all times and in all places.” However, this bar rests in part on executive orders overturnable at the stroke of a pen. The committee recommended that the United States amend its laws and withdraw its reservation implying a territorial limitation on CAT applicability. In November 2015, President Obama signed into law, as part of the FY 2016 defense authorization bill, the McCain-Feinstein amendment to effectively prohibit torture by U.S. government agencies. Even so, the new law does not address the CAT committee’s concern for lack of accountability and redress. No CIA or military personnel have been prosecuted for torture per se (although low-ranking military personnel have been prosecuted for lesser offenses). Nor has there been civil redress. In 2014, the D.C. Circuit ruled that Congress had barred a civil damages remedy for a detainee allegedly tortured at Guantanamo. Janko v. Gates, 741 F.3d 136 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1530 (2015). Secret Detention For at least five years after 2001, the CIA held detainees in secret “black sites” overseas. While a 2009 Executive Order directed that the CIA close its sites and not open any new ones, that order is not embodied in legislation. The CAT committee recommended that the United States “[e]nsure that no one is held in secret detention anywhere under its de facto effective control.” The committee reiterated that secret detention is a per se CAT violation. Indefinite Detention without Trial The CAT committee reminded the United States that “indefinite detention without trial constitutes, per se, a violation” of CAT. It noted that during the period under review nine deaths occurred at Guantanamo, including seven suicides, as well as repeated suicide attempts and mass hunger strike protests. In March 2015, the United States reported to the UN Human Rights Committee that of the 122 prisoners still at Guantanamo, 56 were cleared for transfer, had not yet been transferred, and had no immediate relief in sight; 10 were involved in some form of criminal justice; and the remaining 56 were “eligible for review” by the Periodic Review Board—i.e., they are still detained indefinitely without trial. The Human Rights Committee expressed concern that detainees at Guantanamo “are not dealt with through the ordinary criminal justice system after a protracted period of over a decade, in some cases.” It recommended that the United States should “ensure either their trial or their immediate release.” Military Commission Trials In March 2015, the United States reported to the Human Rights Committee that 10 Guantanamo detainees were currently facing charges, awaiting sentencing, or serving sentences imposed by military commissions. Although the United States contends that military commission trials are fair, the Committee recommended that the United States ensure that any criminal cases against detainees at Guantanamo be “dealt with through the criminal justice system rather than military commissions.” Drone Deaths As highlighted by President Obama’s recent apologies to families of two American hostages killed in drone attacks, the use of armed drones endangers innocents and raises serious questions under international law. The Human Rights Committee recommended that the United States: “revisit its position regarding legal justification”; ensure compliance with the principles of “precaution, distinction and proportionality”; disclose, subject to operational security, the criteria for drone strikes, the legal basis for specific attacks, the process of target identification, and the circumstances in which drones are used; provide “independent supervision and oversight” of drone attacks; take “all feasible measures to ensure the protection of civilians” in specific attacks; track and assess civilian casualties; investigate and bring to justice anyone responsible for violations of the right to life; and provide victims with effective remedies and compensation. Intelligence Surveillance The Human Rights Committee expressed its concern over NSA surveillance, including the bulk phone metadata surveillance program. It recommended that the United States ensure that interference with privacy comply with “principles of legality, proportionality and necessity, regardless of the nationality or location of the individuals whose communications are under direct surveillance.” While the recently enacted USA Freedom Act is a step toward that goal, more safeguards are needed. See, e.g., Neema Singh Guliani, What’s Next for Surveillance Reform after the USA Freedom Act, ACLU (June 3, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/blog/washington-markup/whats-next-surveillance-reform-after-usa-freedom-act. Police Killings The CERD committee expressed “concern at the brutality and excessive use of force by law enforcement officials against members of racial and ethnic minorities, including against unarmed individuals.” It recommended improved investigations, reporting, and redress. Criminal Justice The Human Rights Committee and CERD committee expressed a range of concerns about racial disparities in the criminal justice system, including racial profiling, stop-and-frisk arrests, and racial disparities in sentencing, including the death penalty. Voting The Human Rights Committee expressed concern over obstacles to voting, including burdensome voter identification and eligibility requirements. It recommended that voting rights be restored to felons who have completed their sentences, and that states “review automatic denial of the vote to any imprisoned felon, regardless of the nature of the offence.” Conclusion The foregoing is only a sampling of treaty committee recommendations, constrained by limitations of space. Interested readers can find the full committee reports and extensive documentation at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx. For anyone concerned about human rights in the United States, the inquiry is well worth the effort.

#### No war in Asia---numerous checks.

Green 20, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Cincinnati. (Brendan, 5-6-2020, "Security Threats in Contemporary World Politics: Potential Hegemons, Partnerships, and Primacy", Published in *A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security*, https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/security-threats-contemporary-world-politics-potential-hegemons#dangers-american-alliances)

Primacy and the Goldilocks Problem

A broad range of research in international relations suggests that, under most circumstances, great power politics in Asia is likely to be peaceful. Defensive realists have long argued that the costs of conquests are extraordinarily high; their theories are especially relevant in Asia, where maritime geography and the likely presence of secure nuclear arsenals provide a large defensive advantage.21 Liberal arguments often come to the same conclusion by a different route: economic exchange has skyrocketed in Asia, creating the capitalist interdependence that is often said to incentivize peace. Modern economies have become more difficult to exploit, meaning that fewer economic gains are to be had from conquest.22

One could further add cognitive, normative, and biological arguments: Steven Pinker has recently argued that humans are moving away from warfare for all those reasons, while John Mueller has contended that major war among modern, industrial societies has already gone the way of dueling among people.23 Even the Asian absence of two traditional liberal causes of peace—widespread democracy and dense institutionalization—has become a less compelling worry. Although Asia lacks the institutionalization of European politics, it is not exactly devoid of institutions, which have increased in number, membership, and overlapping linkages since the end of the Cold War.24 More Asian regimes are democracies than ever before, and China’s autocratic regime appears to bias its external politics in favor of compromise, so that it can maintain domestic control.25

#### ASEAN fails to moderate conflict

Hartcher 17, Australian journalist and the Political and International Editor of the Sydney Morning Herald, visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute, a Sydney-based foreign policy think tank (Peter Hartcher, 8-28-2017, "ASEAN: The Asian strategic player that stinks," Sydney Morning Herald, https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/asean-the-asian-strategic-player-that-stinks-20170828-gy5g7f.html)

The hope of a better Myanmar under the much-admired Aung San Suu Kyi now looks forlorn. The crisis of Myanmar's Muslim minority community, the Rohingya, continues to escalate. Since Friday, news has been emerging of mass violence between the Myanmar army and Rohingya militants. At least 90 people are reported dead. The Rohingya are the world's biggest community of stateless people. Somewhere around 1 million of them live among Myanmar's 50 million Buddhists.They've lived in northern Myanmar's Rakhine state for centuries yet are despised and denied the right to citizenship. Some reported being called "Bengal bastards" as their Buddhist neighbours joined the army in clubbing them on the weekend. Thousands of Rohingya civilians responded to the fighting by trying to flee the country, crossing the Naf River into Bangladesh. Some made it but the Bangladeshis are turning most back.The Rohingya are not blameless; their militia reportedly started the violence on Friday by attacking 30 police stations in Myanmar. But they are not the sole culprits. In fact, it seems that the Rohingya resistance is fighting back after brutal years-long repression by the authorities. Late last year the government forces committed crimes of rape and murder and arson against the Rohingya that "seem to have been widespread as well as systematic, indicating the very likely commission of crimes against humanity," according to a February report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Aung San Suu Kyi's response? The State Councillor and de facto ruler of Myanmar said the reports were made up. Consistently, she blames the Rohingya and refuses to accept any government responsibility. While Suu Kyi was an outstanding ambassador for her repressed opposition party while it suffered under the heel of the military regime, she seems quite indifferent, even hostile, to the oppressed minority suffering under the heel of her regime. The news across the border in Thailand on Friday wasn't terribly good either. The former prime minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, fled the country rather than face the verdict of the Supreme Court on a charge that she was negligent in operating a national rice-buying scheme. Not that she had any chance of a fair hearing. She'd already been fined $1 billion over the same matter. She was facing 10 years in prison. The case against her was merely part of the military junta's consolidation of power. Sadly, Thailand's conservative establishment simply refuses to allow the people to choose their own government. It will sometimes allow elections but then overturns them if it doesn't like the result. First her brother's popular, pro-poor government was overthrown by a military coup in 2006. Then, when she replaced him as head of his party and had the temerity to win an election, it was her turn. Now it seems she will join him in exile, living between Dubai and London. The Bangkok court ruling was to merely tidy up, by firmly taking her out of future politics. It wasn't so much the rice-buying scheme that the establishment objected to, although it was a botch job that collapsed leaving the government billions in debt. Their real complaint was that Yingluck Shinawatra used the scheme to redistribute income to farmers - mostly poor family enterprises - by paying above-market prices for their harvest. That, while disdaining the rich elites, was her true crime. Democracy, good governance, political freedom, personal liberty from the state are in shabby condition in both Myanmar and Thailand. And looking a little further, the state of the neighbourhood isn't much better, unfortunately. "There are brief moments of exuberance and optimism," says an ANU expert on South-east Asia, Nicholas Farrelly, "but when you look at the deep structure of forces across the board you see that democracy across South-east Asia is very shallow and nobody is really prepared to give it the nourishment it needs. "As recently as the mid-2000s there were plenty of powerful voices across the region looking for a different kind of politics; they have gone quiet," says Farrelly, founder of the New Mandala website on South-east Asian affairs. Farrelly ranks the 10 principal countries of the region according to their success as democratic systems, and "there is not much dissent among experts that Indonesia is on the top rung". Next, he says, is the Philippines, despite President Rodrigo Duterte's startlingly brutal human rights abuses and the advent of a new Daesh, so-called Islamic State, outpost. This is followed by Myanmar, and then the two neighbouring quasi-autocracies of Malaysia and Singapore. Sixth place in Farrelly's reckoning is Thailand: "If you have a hardline military dictatorship and you're prepared to give it mid ranking in the democracy stakes, that tells you a lot about the state of the region." Last are Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Brunei. But what of their regional association, the much-vaunted Association of South East Asian Nations? This is ASEAN's 50th anniversary and there's been much gushing about its success. But which of the region's crises has it solved, and which is it attempting to tackle? The truth is that, whether it's the region's economic crisis of 1997, the Rohingya refugee crisis of today or anything in between, ASEAN is next to useless. But isn't ASEAN a key strategic player that can help manage China's ambitions and maintain the peace in South-east Asia? That's the claim of its boosters. Unfortunately not. Splitting ASEAN was child's play for Beijing. Two of China's client states, Laos and Cambodia, object whenever other ASEAN members try to complain about China's conduct. So ASEAN can't even issue a communique that breathes the least criticism of Beijing, much less takes any action. China has picked off the ASEAN states one by one in the South China Sea while ASEAN looks on uselessly. ASEAN is useful for intermediating between the elites of the region's capitals, says Farrelly, "keeping a certain kind of conversation. But for a serious crisis, there's simply no way ASEAN can play a serious role."ASEAN is a bit like South-east Asia's so-called king of fruits, the durian. Looks impressively large and spiky from a distance. On closer inspection it stinks.

#### They don’t solve emerging threats---Daniel isn’t about liberal norms but institutional tech management---that’s not the aff (blue)

1AC Daniel 20 – (\*Owen Cotton-Barratt \*\*Max Daniel and \*\*\*Anders Sandberg \*Research Scholars Programme Director @ Future of Humanity Institute @ Oxford University, DPhil in pure mathematics from Oxford University, worked as a Research Fellow at the University of Southampton \*\*Research Scholars Project Manager @ Future of Humanity Institute @ Oxford University, master’s in mathematics with a minor in philosophy from Heidelberg University \*\*\*Researcher @ Future of Humanity Institute @ Oxford University, Senior Research Fellow on the ERC UnPrEDICT Programme, Ph.D. in computational neuroscience from Stockholm University; published May 2020, Global Policy Volume 11, Issue 3, "Defence in Depth Against Human Extinction: Prevention, Response, Resilience, and Why They All Matter," doa: 11-8-2021) url: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1758-5899.12786

To be able to prevent natural risks, we need research aimed at identifying potential hazards, understanding their dynamics, and eventually develop ways to reduce their rate of occurrence.

To avoid unseen and latent risks, we can promote norms such as appropriate risk management principles at institutions that engage in plausibly risky activities; note that there is an extensive literature on rivalling risk management principles (e.g. Foster et al., 2000; O’Riordan and Cameron, 1994; Sandin, 1999; Sunstein, 2005; Wiener, 2011), especially in the face of catastrophic risks (Baum, 2015; Bostrom, 2013; Buchholz and Schymura, 2012; Sunstein, 2007, 2009; Tonn, 2009; Tonn and Stiefel, 2014) – advocating for any particular principle is beyond the scope of this article. See also Jebari (2015) for a discussion of how heuristics from engineering safety may help prevent unseen, latent, and accident risks. Regular horizon scanning may identify previously unknown risks, enabling us to develop targeted prevention measures. Organisations must be set up in such a way that warnings of newly discovered risks reach decision-makers (see Clarke and Eddy, 2017, for case studies where this failed).

### Trade Advantage

#### 1. Interdependence doesn’t solve war—their stats are bad:

#### a. correlation—they don’t assume other factors

Miller 14

(Charles Miller, lecturer at ANU’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, “Globalisation and war,” <http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/globalisation-and-war/> , April 2014)

John O’Neal and Bruce Russett’s work is perhaps the best known in this regard—and Steven Pinker cites them approvingly in his book The Better Angels of Our Nature. Analysing trade and conflict data from the nineteenth to the twenty-first centuries, they found that trade flows do have a significant impact in reducing the chances of conflict, even when taking a variety of other factors into account. But their conclusions have in turn been questioned by other scholars. For one thing, their model failed to take three things into account. First, it’s quite possible that **peace causes trade rather than the other way around**—no company wants to start an export business to another country if it anticipates that business linkages will be cut off by war further down the line. Second, conflict behaviour exhibits what’s called ‘network effects’— if France and Germany are at peace, chances are Belgium and Germany will be too. And third, both the likelihood of conflict and the level of trade are influenced by the number of years a pair of countries has already been at peace—because prolonged periods of peace increase mutual trust. Take **any of these factors** into account, and studies have shown (here and here) that the apparent **relationship between trade flows and peace disappears**. Perhaps, though, conceiving of globalisation solely in terms of trade flows is mistaken. Alternative indicators of globalisation include foreign direct investment, financial openness and the levels of government intervention in economic relations with the rest of the world. Data on those variables is less extensive than on trade flows, usually dating back only to the post World War II period. But some analysts, such as Patrick McDonald and Erik Gartzke, have argued that a significant correlation can be found between them and a reduction in the probability of conflict. Those findings, newer than O’Neal and Russett’s, haven’t yet been subjected to the same intense scrutiny, so may in turn be qualified by future research. What does all that mean for the policy-maker? The statistical evidence certainly doesn’t tell us that globalisation has made war in East Asia impossible. ‘Cromwell’s law’ counsels us that a logically conceivable event should never be assigned a probability of zero. The most we could conclude is that globalisation has made such an occurrence much less likely. There’s some hopeful numerical evidence that globalisation does indeed have that effect, but the evidence isn’t so compelling that we can substitute an economic engagement policy for a security policy. By all means, let’s continue to promote trade in the Asia-Pacific. But we should also continue to be prepared for scenarios which are unlikely but would be hugely damaging if they were to occur.

#### b. samples—they only focus on dyads

**Chatagnier and Kavakli 17** – (2017, J. Tyson, PhD in Political Science, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Houston, and Kerim Can, PhD in Political Science, assistant professor at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Sabanci University in Turkey, “From Economic Competition to Military Combat: Export Similarity and International Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 61, Issue 7, 2017)

International trade has long been thought to facilitate peace among nations (Kant [1795] 1970). A voluntary exchange of goods that leaves both parties better off inherently raises the value of each side to the other, increasing the cost of conflict. The belief that economic interaction can ignite a positive dynamic of cooperation and reduce conflictual behavior is so intuitive and widespread that some political pundits have even heralded free trade as the path to world peace (see, e.g., Griswold 1998; Boudreaux 2006).The conventional wisdom within the international relations literature (e.g., Oneal and Russett 1997; Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2003; Polachek and Xiang 2010) reinforces these claims, having found consistent empirical (and theoretical) links between trade and peace. At the same time, however, there is certainly evidence that trade can exacerbate rivalry and conflict between states. Throughout history, states have fought their competitors for advantage (i.e., access to inputs and markets) in the global marketplace. For instance, in his authoritative account of the Anglo-German rivalry before World War I, Kennedy (1980, 464) concludes that “the most profound cause [of the conflict], surely, was economic”. More specifically, the cause was “the detectable increase in Anglo-German trade rivalry since Bismarck’s time as the latter country steadily became more competitive.” Moreover, while modern empirical international relations research has largely come down on the side of the neoliberals, it has not been monolithic. Indeed, numerous studies by Barbieri (1996, 2002) have demonstrated that increased trade actually has the potential to aggravate tensions between states. These inconsistencies in both the historical and analytical records raise questions about the simplicity of the link between trade and conflict. Additionally, **the vast majority of previous work considers only the bilateral effects** of trade, neglecting the way in which trade between two actors can affect a third. **We remedy this oversight** by analyzing the effects of trade competition, arguing that the tension produced by export competition can be an important source of international conflict. More specifically, we highlight that economic actors who face foreign competition have an incentive to use military power to gain an advantage in international markets. These domestic actors can use their economic power to influence their nation’s political elites and increase the likelihood that economic conflict erupts into war. We support this theoretical argument with **several well-established historical cases** including the seventeenth-century **Dutch-English** commercial rivalry, the pre-World War I **Anglo-German** rivalry, and the **1990 invasion of Kuwait** by Iraq. Our argument suggests that, although trade can have a pacifying direct effect at the dyadic level, it also has strong indirect effects, which can be conflict aggravating. We test this argument using commodity-level trade data from 1962 to 2000. We measure each country pair’s portfolio similarity along nearly 1,300 commodity categories and test the effect of this variable on several indicators of international conflict. Our results strongly support our claim that countries that produce and export similar goods are **significantly more likely to fight, even taking into account their bilateral trade**. **These findings are robust** to several checks on model specification as well as alternative explanations. We also show that our findings are not driven by oil or other strategic resources and that they hold for both raw and manufactured goods. In light of these results, **we are confident that we have identified a significant and practically important cause of war**.

#### 2. Trade strong and resilient

Tett 20, chair of the editorial board and editor-at-large of the US Financial Times. (Gillian, 12-3-2020, "Reports of globalisation’s death are greatly exaggerated", Financial *Times*, https://www.ft.com/content/4ab21d78-270f-4c92-b9ce-4adf75041005)

I would hazard a cautious bet that 2021 turns into a year when globalisation enjoys a rebound — in spite of all the recent signals to the contrary. To understand why, take a look at a set of metrics compiled each year by the logistics company DHL and New York University‘s Stern Business School.

The latest report, which was released on Thursday, shows that 2020 has indeed tipped globalisation into retreat — at least in the short run. Taking 2000 as a baseline of 100, the index hit 126 in 2017, 122 in the past two years and is provisionally projected to have slipped to somewhere in the range of 111 and 121 this year (sensibly, it is presented as a band in the report).

However, even with this reversal, the index is expected to stay above the low of 111 it hit in 2008 and the details of the report indicate it will almost certainly rebound next year. That might seem self-interested: DHL is a logistics company whose fortunes rely on globalisation.

But the reasons for optimism rest with a crucial point: there are several aspects to globalisation and these do not always move in tandem.

The DHL/NYU survey tracks the movement of four things: people, money, goods and ideas. In the first category, people, globalisation has collapsed this year to levels last seen in 1990. No surprise, given national lockdowns.

Money flows have also slowed, after trending sideways since the 2008 financial crisis. Trade flows have followed a similar pattern: while there was a sharp rise in cross-border trade in the late 20th century, as western companies created global supply chains, trade globalisation has trended slightly down in recent years, depressed by developments such as the US-China trade war. Unsurprisingly, it tumbled during the coronavirus economic shock this spring.

Dig into the trade picture, though, and the pattern looks more complex. Since the spring, activity has rebounded more dramatically than many economists initially expected. Indeed it is running just 3 to 4 per cent below pre-pandemic level and the World Trade Organization now thinks that total global trade volume will “only” drop 9.2 per cent in 2020. That is less dire than the 12.9 per cent decline it projected in April.

This rebound might fizzle out, since the WTO thinks it partly reflects restocking. Or maybe not. What is particularly striking is that companies are not reformatting and reshoring supply chains quite as some doomsayers expected.

There are certainly signs that top executives are worried about cross-border risks: a recent HSBC survey of 10,000 global companies shows that 93 per cent are worried about their supply chains, due to risks from political unrest and protectionism.

A separate report from McKinsey also shows that companies now expect a month-long disruption to hit their supply chains once — on average — every 3.7 years, be that from climate change, cyber attacks, political unrest or trade wars. The Covid-19 disruption, in other words, is not regarded as a one-off.

That has prompted some companies to bring some activities back “home” — as protectionist politicians such as US president Donald Trump have demanded. But most are doing something else: diversifying into multiple locations, instead of relying on just one supply chain, the McKinsey and HSBC reports suggest. Hedging is all the rage.

Even if supply chains are being reformatted into more flexible shapes, goods will still keep whizzing across borders. This helps to explain another detail of the HSBC survey: the executives expect trade to be strong in 2021.

The DHL/NYU survey also tracks a fourth aspect of globalisation: information flows. This metric has surged in recent years due to the internet, and the pandemic has intensified the dash to digital. Cross-border internet traffic jumped 48 per cent from mid-2019 to mid-2020, twice the annual rate seen in the previous three years.

In theory, this might undercut the need for physical links as video calls replace some travel. In reality, the globalisation of information fuels global ecommerce, making cross-border supply chains more flexible — and boosting collaboration in areas such as vaccine research. Protectionism remains a risk. China’s curbs on the internet are a case in point. But even that seems unlikely to tip this fourth aspect of globalisation into overall retreat; at least not anytime soon.

So the next time a politician (or voter) rails against “globalisation”, ask which aspect of the “g” word is under attack. After all, you are probably reading about anti-globalisation on the global internet, which illustrates my point. Covid-19 has caused globalisation to mutate, but not killed it off. Indeed, 2021 might yet deliver a surprising recovery.

#### 3. COVID thumps.

Kampf 20, senior PhD fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies at The Fletcher School. (David, 6/16/20, “How COVID-19 Could Increase the Risk of War”, *World Politics Review*, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28843/how-covid-19-could-increase-the-risk-of-war)

The coronavirus pandemic immediately elicited further calls to reduce dependence on other countries, with Trump using the opportunity to pressure U.S. companies to reconfigure their supply chains away from China. For its part, China made sure that it had the homemade supplies it needed to fight the virus before exporting extras, while countries like France and Germany barred the export of face masks, even to friendly nations. And widening economic inequalities, a consequence of the pandemic, are not likely to enhance support for free trade.

This assault on open trade and globalization is just one aspect of a decaying liberal international order, which, its proponents argue, has largely helped to preserve peace between nations since World War II. But that old order is almost gone, and in all likelihood isn’t coming back. The U.N. Security Council appears increasingly fragmented and dysfunctional. Even before Trump, the world’s most powerful country ratified fewer treaties per year under the Obama administration than at any time since 1945.

Trump’s presidency only harms multilateral cooperation further. He has backed out of the Paris Agreement on climate change, reneged on the Iran nuclear deal, picked fights with allies, questioned the value of NATO and defunded the World Health Organization in the middle of a global health crisis. Hyper-nationalism, rather than international collaboration, was the default response to the coronavirus outbreak in the U.S. and many other countries around the world.

## 2NC

### T

#### Vote neg. Extra-topical planks moot core DAs and lead to extraneous advantages. They did this for a reason---FTC is the only core DA on the topic. It’s try-or-die to protect the neg, because the topic is already overwhelmingly large WITHOUT an expansive interpretation of “at least”

Waller 20, John Paul Stevens Chair in Competition Law, Professor, and Director of Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies at the Loyola University Chicago School of Law, and Jacob E. Morse, J.D. Candidate at the Loyola University Chicago School of Law (Spencer Weber, “The Political Face of Antitrust”, Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial, and Commercial Law, Volume 15, July 2020, <https://awards.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/_11_weber_waller_v21_formatted_1_.pdf?68864/b1fc17637de92baef13f2a93eb750f872a721091>)

IV. Antitrust in Civil Society

Competition issues are also part of the general civic discourse separate from the campaign rhetoric and legislative proposals offered by politicians. This is also a significant sign that antitrust has begun to be an important source of small “p” politics that engages substantial segments of the public at large.

One example is the increased number of non-technical books intended for a lay audience that deal with the role of antitrust in a healthy economy and democracy. Recent and forthcoming books dealing with these themes include Tim Wu’s “The Curse of Bigness,”109 Matt Stoller’s “Goliath,”110 Maurice Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi’s “Competition Overdose,”111 Zephyr Teachout’s “Break ‘em Up,”112 and David Dayan’s “Monopolized.”113 On the academic side, there are a plethora of government and NGO studies of competition policy on digital competition114 and new works are flourishing which explore the broader ramifications of antitrust and competition in society.115

Long form and more mass-market journalism have also taken up the mantle of exploring the role of antitrust and competition policy. Such diverse magazines as The Atlantic,116 Time,117 New Republic,118 American Prospect,119 Rolling Stone,120 New York Times magazine,121 Variety,122 National Review,123 Foreign Policy,124 and other policy and opinion magazines have all run recent stories or profiles of individuals involved in antitrust issues. Before the COVID-19 pandemic effectively monopolized press coverage in the United States, there were thirty-three antitrust related stories on the front page of the New York Times or the front page of its business section over a three-month period in late 2019.125 A majority of the stories focused on tech giants such as Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Facebook.126 In addition, the New York Times also covered stories about mergers, merger policy, local issues such as the Chicago taxi market, and various smaller industries.127 This is separate from coverage during the same period of campaign issues and candidate statements relating to the field.

A similar increase in coverage during this same period can be observed anecdotally in more business-oriented publications like Forbes, Barron’s, Wired, and the Wall Street Journal; general newspapers like USA Today, Washington Post, and Huffington Post; more local newspapers; as well as radio and television.128 Web pages and social media accounts on these issues have similarly proliferated on all ideological perspectives.129

Lobbying and public policy groups are growing in number and influence. Beyond the traditional trade associations and general think tanks there are now a number of active groups with antitrust as a large part of their focus. These include the Open Markets Institute,130 American Antitrust Institute,131 Anti-Monopoly Fund,132 Institute for Self-Reliance,133 Public Citizen,134 Public Knowledge,135 Demos,136 and the International Center for Law and Economics.137

At the more technical legal end of the debate, antitrust is similarly flourishing as a field. One sees increased law school hiring in the field for the first time in decades. Academic institutes and centers abound with a wide variety of perspectives ranging from libertarian to enforcement oriented.138 Most major antitrust cases now feature multiple amicus briefs from legal and economic experts on both sides of an issue both in the Supreme Court or the Courts of Appeals.139

Conclusion

Antitrust has always been political in nature. Antitrust law provides broad legal commands dealing with how governments and private individuals can challenge different types of market behavior. In this way, antitrust has not changed.

Antitrust will never take the place of sports, the Dow Jones index, or the weather for conversation at the breakfast table, but it has become a meaningful part of the political and policy debate for candidates, the legislature, and important segments of civil society. What has changed, however, is the degree that antitrust has reentered the political arena. Once mostly the domain of technocrats, antitrust issues have been proposed and debated by Presidential candidates, political parties, legislators, pundits, journalists, lobby groups, and voters alike. There are also a flurry of serious proposals and investigations that would make significant changes to the current system if adopted.

#### At least means the minimum that must be done. Not that everything beyond it is allowable

Collins 2016 Collins English Dictionary 2016 http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/at-least

at least (ət liːst)

the minimum. a variant form of at the least

at least

a. if nothing else ⇒ you should at least try

b. at the least▷ See least

at least

phrase You use at least to say that a number or amount is the smallest that is possible or likely and that the actual number or amount may be greater. The forms at the least and at the very least are also used. ⇒ ...a dinner menu featuring at least 15 different sorts of fish. ⇒ Aim to have at least half a pint of milk each day. ⇒ About two-thirds of adults consult their doctor at least once a year. ⇒ Normally it has only had eleven or twelve members in all. Now it will have seventeen at the very least. →

at least

phrase You use at least to say that something is the minimum that is true or possible . The forms at the least and at the very least are also used. ⇒ She could take a nice holiday at least. ⇒ He is at least content that there will be no immediate use of force. ⇒ At the least, I needed some sleep. ⇒ His possession of classified documents in his home was, at the very least, a violation of Navy security regulations. → least

at least

phrase You use at least to indicate an advantage that exists in spite of the disadvantage or bad situation that has just been mentioned. ⇒ We've no idea what his state of health is but at least we know he is still alive. ⇒ If something awful happens to you at least you can write about it. → least

at least

phrase You use at least to indicate that you are correcting or changing something that you have just said. ⇒ It's not difficult to get money for research or at least it's not always difficult. ⇒ The police say his death was an accident, officially at least. ⇒ They didn't actually like the magazine very much, but they bought it or, at the least, borrowed it from each other. → least

Example sentences containing 'at least'

Few people had died on the cricket pitch, at least in recent times. Garth Nix LIRAEL: DAUGHTER OF THE CLAYRDamin turned away, to give them at least the illusion of privacy. Jennifer Fallon TREASON KEEPHe scrambled to his feet, managing to bow at least half a dozen times on the way up. Jennifer Fallon TREASON KEEP

Similar Words

at the minimum, at the very least, not less than

#### “By At least” DOES NOT IMPLY that the following action is SUFFICIENT

Longman Dictionary (of Contemporary English, <https://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/at-least>) //Snowball

at least

a) not less than a particular number or amount

It will take you at least 20 minutes to get there.

He had at least £100,000 in savings.

at the (very) least (=not less than and probably much more than)

It would cost $1 million at the very least.

b) even if something better is not true or is not done

At least he didn’t lie to me.

I don’t expect you to pay me, but you could at least cover my expenses.

The house still needed a lot of work, but at least the kitchen was finished.

#### “At least” implies NECESSITY, but not SUFFICIENCY.

Hanks no date (Craig, Chair of Philosophy at Texas State University, “Confusion of Necessary with a Sufficient Condition,” <https://www.txstate.edu/philosophy/resources/fallacy-definitions/Confusion-of-Necessary.html>) //Snowball

Confusion of Necessary with a Sufficient Condition

A causal fallacy you commit this fallacy when you assume that a necessary condition of an event is sufficient for the event to occur. A necessary condition is a condition that must be present for an event to occur. A sufficient condition is a condition or set of conditions that will produce the event. A necessary condition must be there, but it alone does not provide sufficient cause for the occurrence of the event. Only the sufficient grounds can do this. In other words, all of the necessary elements must be there.

Examples:

Juan: "How do you think you'll do on our philosophy exam tomorrow?" Monique: "Great, I read all the books." Juan: "Yeah but do you understand this stuff?" Monique: "I said I read all the books, didn't I?"

Don't let all the talk about the necessity of exercise to a long life mislead you. Jim was a jock all his very short life.

Who said food keeps us alive? Tom died a few days ago and he was not short of good food.

I don't know why the car won't run; I just filled the gas tank.

Why don't you want to spend your life with me? I love you, and am I not good to you?

The counselor told me that if I wanted to graduate I must have at least 128 credit hours. Well, I've got that, but they're saying I won't walk this semester. How misleading!

#### That means meeting “expand the scope” does not necessarily “prohibit anticompetitive business practices”

Dul 15 (Jan, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Necessary Condition Analysis (NCA): Logic and Methodology of “Necessary but Not Sufficient” Causality, 15 July 2015, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1094428115584005>) //Snowball

Although scholars often confuse necessity and sufficiency (Chung, 1969; Goertz & Starr, 2003), the two are totally different.1 A necessary cause allows an outcome to exist; without the necessary cause, the outcome will not exist. A sufficient cause ensures that the outcome exists; it produces the outcome. A student who wants to be admitted to a U.S. graduate school (the outcome) needs to have a high score on the Graduate Record Examinations (GRE) test: An adequate GRE score is necessary for the outcome. Necessary causes are not automatically sufficient. An adequate GRE score is not sufficient for admission because also other admission requirements play a role (e.g., the student’s motivation letter, a good TOEFL score, reputation of the student’s bachelor program, recommendation letter). However, if the student’s GRE score is too low, there is guaranteed failure, independently of the student’s performance on the other requirements. Therefore, a necessary cause is a constraint, a barrier, an obstacle, a bottleneck that must be managed to allow a desired outcome to exist. Each single necessary cause must be in place, as there is no additive causality that can compensate for the absence of the necessary cause. Prevention of guaranteed failure and increased probability of success are core constituents of the “necessary but not sufficient” logic of “X causes Y.”2

#### **Expand means make greater**

Maine Supreme Court 2k (SAUFLEY, J. Opinion in Bangs v. Town of Wells, 760 A. 2d 632 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2000. Google scholar caselaw. Date accessed 7/12/21).

[¶ 19] Wells's interpretation of subsection 3(M) is not consistent with the plain language of the statute. See Kimball, 2000 ME 20, ¶ 18, 745 A.2d at 392 (explaining the rules of statutory construction). The plain meaning of the word "expand" means "to make or become greater in size."[9] WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY 241 (1996). Further, the language of the statute requires that municipalities give reasonable consideration to the expansion of existing "mobile home parks" as opposed to allowing "mobile home park lots" or "mobile home park density" to expand. Therefore, a logical and consistent reading of the statute encompasses mobile home parks' growth in physical area rather than merely in density. See Town of Madison, Dep't of Elec. Works v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 682 A.2d 231, 234 (Me.1996).

#### **Scope means range**

Wisconsin Court of Appeals 20 (BLANCHARD, J. Opinion in APPLEGATE-BADER FARM, LLC v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue, Appeal No. 2018AP1239 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2020). Google scholar caselaw. Date accessed 7/21/21).

¶45 Returning to the text of WIS. STAT. § 227.135(4), we identify the meaning of the term "scope." Neither WIS. STAT. § 227.01 nor § 227.135 define "scope." Therefore, we resort to dictionary definitions that appear to be pertinent. "Scope" in § 227.135(4) means the range or extent of the subject involved in the "proposed rule."[13] We now address the wider context of WIS. STAT. ch. 227 as a whole, which demonstrates that the range or extent of a subject referenced in § 227.135(4) cannot reasonably be read to focus narrowly on any "meaningful or measurable" changes to draft rules.

#### **Core antitrust laws are the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts**

Sukesh 20 (Rahul Sukesh-Fordham University. “Investigating a Mega-Merger: Contextualizing the T-Mobile Merger to the Consumer Welfare Standard and the Competition Standard“ , Fordham Undergraduate Law Review, Volume 2, Article 6, 2020, <https://research.library.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040&context=fulr> , date accessed 9/4/21)

As the basis for the lawsuit and pending concern against the merger between T-Mobile and Sprint cited issues of antitrust law, having a general understanding of antitrust law will shed light on the breath of the issue. In practice today, there are three core antitrust laws: the Sherman Act of 1890, and the more recent Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) and Clayton Act both of 1914.226 The Sherman Act and Clayton Act are more significant to the implications of this case. In detail, the Sherman Act outlaws any attempt to restrict or monopolize trade within reasonable measure. Seemingly vague, this act applies to action that would hinder competition. Added to supplement the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act “addresses specific practices… such as mergers… the Sherman Act does not clearly prohibit” that would still hinder competition.”227

#### Contextually, “expand the scope of antitrust law” refers to proposals which change how companies are forced to operate

Agarwal 21 (Asheesh Agarwal is an alumnus of the Federal Trade Commission. “The New Google Suits” , <https://lawliberty.org/the-new-google-suits/> , JANUARY 13, 2021, date accessed 9/3/21)

These lawsuits, along with two suits against Facebook, firmly move the antitrust debate from Congress to the courts. Many reformers, particularly on the left but also on the right, are seeking to expand the scope of antitrust law. Some proposals would force companies to separate into single lines of business, hamper certain firms’ ability to acquire other companies, and even have antitrust law take into account amorphous values like “fairness” and “democratic ideals.” With these lawsuits pending, Congress is less likely to enact major antitrust legislation. Many reformers, such as House Judiciary Chairman Jerrold Nadler, praised the lawsuits as an “important step” in preserving competition online. Given that the existing laws, as written, may well allow the courts to address any competitive concerns, antitrust reformers will have a harder time persuading their colleagues that Congress must overhaul the antitrust laws now. At the very least, given that the most significant antitrust cases in two decades are now in the courts, Congress should take a deep breath before trying to rewrite a century of antitrust law.

#### Finite resource tradeoffs is a core controversy in the antitrust literature

Sokol 20, University of Florida Research Foundation Professor of Law, University of Florida (Daniel, “Antitrust's "Curse of Bigness" Problem ,” <https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2020&context=facultypub>)

Antitrust works well because it is technocratic in that a singular (but flexible within its economics) goal is administrable institutionally. To introduce the world of political imperfections into a technical process that examines markets would create further distortions affecting consumers.152 Antitrust does well dealing with antitrust problems. To the extent that there are other related problems, the right answer is not to create an antitrust that lacks democratic accountability (because antitrust becomes regulation via the backdoor) and exceeds its mandate of the past forty years. Rather, the better solution is to identify the underlying problem and solve it with more effective tools. If the problem is one of redistribution, tax is a better choice than antitrust.153 If the problem is one of privacy, strengthen privacy laws. 154 If the problem is one of financial institutions or sector regulators not doing what they need to do, correct structural problems with sector regulators. Antitrust has increasingly moved out of sector regulation 155 and toward advocacy. 156 The advocacy budget of the antitrust agencies is tiny, and to the extent that the problem is the rules of the game for particular industry sectors, Wu falls short by not suggesting greater competition advocacy. Wu’s concern with big tech companies because they are big (p. 126) is as misplaced now as it was earlier in antitrust history. Antitrust has gone through various moments in which it had reevaluated whether it has the proper tools to combat anticompetitive behavior in technology-related markets.157 It does have such tools and can bring important cases in these markets.158 It was just a decade ago that we were told that Walmart was taking over shopping, that eBay was the largest online marketplace, or that Facebook was the primary way in which users shared information. Today, Uber competes with Lyft, Amazon has eclipsed eBay, Facebook is a legacy service, and younger people use any other set of applications to share information— such as Pinterest, Twitter, or Snapchat. In a world of continuous change, antitrust is what remains constant. It has the tools to police against unlawful exercise of monopoly power and adapts to changes in economic theory and empirics. To ask antitrust to go beyond its institutional capacity sets up antitrust to fail, because Wu’s deeper concern is with how society is structured. That structure can be changed through elections to the presidency and Congress and through changes as to the makeup of the Supreme Court. Antitrust history shows that it is the Supreme Court that changes antitrust law and policy the most because of antitrust’s common law–like nature. 159

### Outreach Advantage

#### US cred is doomed no matter what.

Kirshner 1-29-2020, Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Boston College. (Jonathan, "Gone But Not Forgotten: Trump’s Long Shadow and the End of American Credibility", *Foreign Affairs*, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-01-29/trump-gone-not-forgotten)

This is why even though Donald Trump has become a member of a rather exclusive club—one-term U.S. presidents—the Trump presidency will have enduring consequences for U.S. power and influence in the world. Leo Tolstoy warned that “there are no conditions to which a man may not become accustomed, particularly if he sees that they are accepted by those around him,” and it is easy, especially for most insular Americans, to implicitly normalize what was in fact a norm-shattering approach to foreign policy. Level whatever criticisms you may about the often bloodstained hands of the American colossus on the world stage, but Trump’s foreign policy was different: shortsighted, transactional, mercurial, untrustworthy, boorish, personalist, and profoundly illiberal in rhetoric, disposition, and creed.

Some applauded this transformation, but most foreign policy experts, practitioners, and professionals are breathing a sigh of relief that a deeply regrettable, and in many ways embarrassing, interlude has passed. (It is exceedingly unlikely that any future president will exchange “beautiful letters” with and express their “love” for the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.) But such palpable relief must be tempered by a dispiriting truth, rooted in that notion of anarchy: the world cannot unsee the Trump presidency. (Nor, for that matter, can it unsee the way members of the U.S. Congress behaved in the final weeks of the Trump administration, voting opportunistically to overturn an election and helping incite violence at the Capitol.) From this point forward, countries around the globe will have to calculate their interests and expectations with the understanding that the Trump administration is the sort of thing that the U.S. political system can plausibly produce.

Such reassessments will not be to the United States’ advantage. For 75 years, the general presumption that the United States was committed to the relationships and institutions it forged and the norms it articulated shaped the world in ways that privileged U.S. interests. If it is increasingly perceived to be feckless and self-serving, the United States will find the world a more hazardous and less welcoming place.

POWER AND PURPOSE

One country tries to anticipate the foreign policy behavior of another by making assessments about two factors: power and purpose. Measuring the former seems straightforward, although it is often not. (France seemed to boast a formidable military in 1939, and the Soviet Union was considered a superpower a half century later, yet both countries suddenly and unexpectedly collapsed under pressure.) Measuring the latter—purpose—requires more guesswork in practice but is even more important. Is a country a friend or a foe, and in either case, for how long? Is a country’s word its bond, or are its commitments ephemeral and its pronouncements little more than shallow, opportunistic posturing? Ultimately, these are questions of trust and confidence that require judgment calls. And for better or worse, it is easier to partner with a country whose underlying foreign policy orientation is rooted in purposes that are reasonably consistent over time.

For U.S. partners in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, however, Washington’s priorities on the world stage must now be interrogated, and any conclusions reached must be held with qualifications rather than confidence. And there is nothing that President Joe Biden and his team of immaculate professionals can do to stop that. From now on, all countries, everywhere, must hedge their bets about the United States—something that will unnerve allies more than adversaries. Whatever promises are made and best behaviors followed over the next few years, a resurgence of knuckle-dragging America firstism will loom menacingly in the shadows. That possibility will inevitably shape other states’ conclusions about their relations with the United States, even as nearly every world leader rushes to shake the hand of the new U.S. president.

Thus, even with the election of Biden—a traditional, centrist liberal internationalist, cut from the same basic foreign policy cloth of every U.S. president (save one) across nine decades—countries will now have to hedge against the prospect of an indifferent, disengaged, and clumsily myopic U.S. foreign policy. After all, anarchy also demands that states see the world as it is, not as they wish it might be. And the warning signs that the United States is perhaps not the country it once was could not be flashing more brightly.

Although the margin of victory in the 2020 U.S. presidential election was wide (the two candidates were separated by seven million votes, a 4.5 percent edge in the popular vote, and 74 electoral votes), it was not, by any stretch of the imagination, a renunciation of Trump. In 2016, some argued that Trump’s election was a fluke. This was always whistling past the graveyard, but the case could be made. After all, the election hinged on only about 80,000 votes, spread across three swing states. Even with that, but for the historically contingent geographic quirks of Michigan (the Upper Peninsula) and Florida (the Panhandle), those states would have gone blue. And the Democratic nominee, Hillary Clinton (who did walk away with the popular vote by a large margin), was, for some key constituencies, a suspect candidate.

The 2020 election put to rest the comforting fable that Trump’s election was a fluke. Trump is the United States—or at least a very large part of it. Many Americans will choke on that sentiment, but other countries don’t have the luxury of clinging to some idealized version of the United States’ national character. Trump presided over dozens of ethical scandals, egregious procedural lapses, and startling indiscretions, most of which would have ended the political career of any other national political figure of the past half century. But the trampling of norms barely registered with most of the American public. Nor did the sheer, horrifying incompetence of the administration’s handling of the gravest public health crisis in a century chase Trump from the political scene in disgrace. (Imagine what would have happened to Jimmy Carter, a decent man dealt a difficult hand by an oil shock and the Iranian hostage crisis. Those events were enough to have his approval rating plummet into the 20s and soon send him packing after his landslide defeat in 1980.) Rather, Trump characteristically treated a pandemic that killed well more than a quarter of a million of the people under his charge as a personal inconvenience, to be managed exclusively for perceived political advantage. Even so, 74 million people voted for him—nine million more than did in 2016 and the most votes ever cast for a U.S. candidate for president, with the exception of Biden, who garnered 81 million.

One cannot paint a picture of the American polity and the country’s future foreign policy without including the significant possibility of a large role for Trumpism, with or without Trump himself in the Oval Office. Looking ahead four years, America watchers must anticipate that the next U.S. presidential election could turn out quite differently. This does not bode well for U.S. interests and influence in world politics. As Mark Leonard, the director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, observed, “If you know that whatever you’re doing will at most last until the next election, you look at everything in a more contingent way.”

#### No nuclear war in Asia—strategic and institutional stability prevents escalation and disproves nuclear pessimism

Kampani and Gopalaswamy 17—Gaurav Kampani, Assistant Professor for the Henry Kendall College of Arts & Sciences at The University of Tulsa, Ph.D., Cornell University, Bharath Gopalaswamy, Director, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council, PhD in mechanical engineering with a specialization in numerical acoustics from Trinity College, Dublin (Foreword to “Asia in the ‘Second Nuclear Age’,” *Atlantic Council*, South Asia Center, November 2017, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/Asia\_in\_the\_Second\_Nuclear\_Age\_web\_1115.pdf)

It is now a truism among foreign and defense policy practitioners that the post-Cold War nuclear buildup in the Indo-Pacific region constitutes the dawn of the “second nuclear age.”1 From the 1990s onward, China’s decision to stir out of its strategic languor and modernize its nuclear arsenal, along with the resolve of India and Pakistan to deploy operational nuclear forces, and, more recently, North Korea’s sprint to develop reliable long-range nuclear capabilities that can credibly threaten the continental United States, has led many to aver that the second nuclear age will rival the worst aspects of the first.

During the first nuclear age, baroque nuclear arms buildups, technical one-upmanship, forward-deployed nuclear forces, and trigger-alert operational postures characterized the competition between the superpowers and their regional allies. The nuclear rivals embraced nuclear war-fighting doctrines, which internalized the notion that nuclear weapons were usable instruments in the pursuit of political ends, and that nuclear wars were winnable.

There is a sense of déjà vu among nuclear pessimists that nuclear developments in China, India, and Pakistan could produce similar outcomes. When North Korea’s nuclear advances are factored in, the prognoses become even direr. More specifically, the second nuclear age consists of two separate systems of nuclear rivalry, with potentially dangerous spillover effects. The first rivalry is centered on India, Pakistan, and China, with a geographic footprint that overlays the larger Indo-Pacific region. The second rivalry encompasses the Northeast Pacific, overlaying the Korean peninsula, Japan, and the United States. North Korean developments, and a potential US overreaction to them, threaten China’s historic nuclear minimalism and its own interests as an emerging global power. Similarly, US suggestions of global retreat, and the retraction of extended deterrence guarantees to its allies in Northeast Asia, could push those allies to acquire independent nuclear arsenals and intensify the second nuclear age.

Until very recently, the threat of a nuclear war was thought most likely in South Asia, where India and Pakistan are involved in a festering low-intensity conflict (LIC) fostered by deep conflicts about identity and territory. Specific dangers include Pakistan’s threats to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in a conventional war with India. Likewise, India’s investments in ballistic-missile defenses (BMD) and multiple-reentry vehicle (MRV) technology could, in theory, afford future decision-makers in New Delhi the means to execute splendid first-strike (a counterforce attack intended to disable the opponent’s nuclear capacity before it is used) options against Pakistan. Prognoses of the nuclear rivalry between India and China are generally less threatening. But, when the latter rivalry is considered in the context of ongoing boundary disputes between New Delhi and Beijing, their self-identification as great powers accounting for nearly 50 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) by mid-century, their participation in regional balance-of power-systems, and potential operational brushes between sea-based nuclear forces forward deployed in the Indian Ocean, those concerns invariably overshadow any optimism.

In the background of the unfolding gloom of the second nuclear age, the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center conducted three workshops in India, Pakistan, and China in the fall of 2016, with the objective of drawing academics, policy practitioners, and analysts in each country to discuss the unfolding nuclear dynamics in the region. All three workshops had a common theme: Assessing Nuclear Futures in Asia. Under this umbrella theme, workshop participants tackled three specific subjects: the general nature of the strategic competition in Indo-Pacific region; the philosophical approaches shaping nuclear developments in China, India, and Pakistan; and the hardware and operational characteristics of their nuclear forces.

The first workshop was conducted in September 2016 at the Center for International Strategic Studies in Islamabad. This was followed by a second workshop in September at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi. The third, and final, workshop was held in November 2016 at the CarnegieTsinghua Center in Beijing. Each workshop involved structured sessions with formal presentations and follow-on roundtable sessions. Notes from each session were transcribed, as everything discussed by the participants during the workshops was on the record.

This report presents the findings of the three workshops, in separate sections on China, India, and Pakistan. The findings combine material from formal presentations, participant discussions, follow-on informal conversations, and external open-source literature to fill some critical gaps.

What stands out in these findings is that regional participants generally reject the nuclear pessimism in Western capitals. The nuclear “sky is falling” argument, they maintain, is simply not supported by the evidence, at least when evidence is embedded in its proper context.

Key Conclusions

• While the first nuclear age was riven by deep ideological conflicts between two contrarian political systems that viewed the victory of the other as an existential threat, the nuclear rivalry between China, India, and Pakistan is nothing like that. All three states accept the legitimacy of the international system, to the extent that they share goals of market capitalism, state sovereignty, and multilateral institutionalism. Undoubtedly, the three states have different domestic political systems: authoritarian capitalist (China), liberal democracy (India), and praetorian democracy (Pakistan). Yet, none of these nuclear powers views the domestic political system of another as jeopardizing its own existence.

• At least two among the three nuclear powers—China and India—have vast strategic depth, excellent geographical defenses, and strong conventional forces. Neither fears a conventional threat to its existence. Leaderships in both countries have a shared belief that nuclear weapons are political weapons whose sole purpose is to deter nuclear use by others. They also share a common institutional legacy of civilian-dominated nuclear decision-making structures, in which the military is only one partner, and a relatively junior one, among a host of others. All three factors—the structural, the normative, and the institutional—dampen both countries’ drives toward trigger-ready, destabilizing, operational nuclear postures that lean toward splendid first-strike options.

• However, this reassurance does not extend to Pakistan, which—due to the lack of geographic depth and weaker conventional forces against India—has embraced a first-use nuclear doctrine. Pakistan’s hybrid praetorian system also allows its military near autonomy in nuclear decision-making. This combination of structural and institutional factors has led Pakistan to elect a rapidly expanding nuclear force that, within a decade, could rival the British, French, and Chinese arsenals in size, though not in sophistication. Evidence also suggests that Pakistan has developed tactical nuclear weapons, although it does not appear to have operationalized tactical nuclear warfare.

• In the nuclear dynamic in the Indo-Pacific region, India and Pakistan are novice developers of nuclear arsenals; the weapons in their inventory are first-generation fission weapons. Likewise, their delivery systems are the first in the cycle of acquisitions. Their hardware acquisitions generate outside concern because of the scope of their ambitions. Both nations plan to deploy a triad capability. Nonetheless, this ambitious goal and the selection of technologies underline the central lesson of the nuclear revolution, which is force survival (to enable an assured secondstrike capability).

• Force survival through secure second-strike capabilities is also China’s goal. It is the only nuclear power among the three that is actually modernizing, i.e., replacing aging delivery systems with newer and better designs. Thus far, the evidence suggests that Chinese and Indian explorations of multiple-reentry vehicle technologies are aimed at reinforcing deterrence through the fielding of more robust second-strike capabilities. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that neither India nor China has, nor is developing, the ancillary intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems necessary to execute splendid first-strike attacks. Another technology of concern is missile defense. India’s goals vis-à-vis missile defense are still unclear, and its technical successes with the program are even less evident. Chinese goals are similarly unclear, and appear to be exploratory means for defeating adversarial attempts to stymie its deterrent capability.

• On a more positive note, neither India nor Pakistan is conducting nuclear tests to develop or improve designs for nuclear warheads. The same holds for China. However, Pakistan is rapidly accumulating fissile material, which could increase to four hundred and fifty kilograms of plutonium, sufficient for ninety weapons, and more than 2,500 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU), sufficient for one hundred simple fission warheads by 2020.2 India is accumulating approximately 16.6 kilograms of fissile material annually, sufficient for a force of approximately 150-200 warheads, though all fissile material is probably not converted into nuclear warheads.3 China, however, is no longer producing fissile material. It is only modestly increasing the size of its arsenal, from 264 to 314 warheads.4 The size of the Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani arsenals will remain a function of the calculations of damage ratios that each believes essential to achieve deterrence. Yet, if current trends remain stable, the size of their arsenals should remain comparable to the French and British nuclear arsenals. The arsenals will be large, but will by no means approach the gargantuan size of the US or Russian nuclear arsenals.

• Like other regional nuclear powers during the first nuclear age, China, India, and Pakistan might also decide to forego one or more vulnerable legs of their nuclear triad. At present, however, there are no indicators of this happening.

• The nuclear rivalry in South Asia remains ominous, because Pakistan wages LIC against India via nonstate actors, while the latter has devised limited conventional-war options to punish the Pakistani military on Pakistani soil. India has also recently hinted that it could abandon nuclear no first use (NFU) in favor of splendid first-strike options. Simultaneously, however, India is backing away from its purported limited-conventional-war doctrine against Pakistan, on the premise that the LIC does not represent an existential threat to Indian security, and that there are other sophisticated methods for dealing with Pakistan’s aggressions that don’t involve pressing nuclear buttons. The decline in India’s appetite for limited conventional war against Pakistan, if institutionalized over time, would represent a game changer and significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war in the region.

#### Safety norms aren’t liberal norms and the aff doesn’t codify them

1AC Daniel 20 – (\*Owen Cotton-Barratt \*\*Max Daniel and \*\*\*Anders Sandberg \*Research Scholars Programme Director @ Future of Humanity Institute @ Oxford University, DPhil in pure mathematics from Oxford University, worked as a Research Fellow at the University of Southampton \*\*Research Scholars Project Manager @ Future of Humanity Institute @ Oxford University, master’s in mathematics with a minor in philosophy from Heidelberg University \*\*\*Researcher @ Future of Humanity Institute @ Oxford University, Senior Research Fellow on the ERC UnPrEDICT Programme, Ph.D. in computational neuroscience from Stockholm University; published May 2020, Global Policy Volume 11, Issue 3, "Defence in Depth Against Human Extinction: Prevention, Response, Resilience, and Why They All Matter," doa: 11-8-2021) url: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1758-5899.12786

Accidents may be prevented by general safety norms that also help reduce unseen risk. In addition, building on our understanding of specific accident scenarios, we can design failsafe systems or follow operational routines that minimise accident risk. In some cases, we may want to eschew an accident-prone technology altogether in favour of safer alternatives. Accident prevention may benefit from research on high reliability organisations (Roberts and Bea, 2001) and lessons learnt from historical accidents. Where effective prevention measures have been identified, it may be beneficial to codify them through norms and law at the national and international levels. Alternatively, if we can internalise the expected damages of accidents through mechanisms such as insurance, we can leverage market incentives.6

### Trade Advantage

#### Trade doesn’t solve war.

White 13, Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the Australian National University. (Hugh, “China: Power and Ambition,” *The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power*, pg. 51-53, Oxford University Press)

Certainly, the more countries trade and invest with one another, the greater the economic cost of conflict and the stronger the incentive to keep the peace. America and China today are more interdependent economically than any two comparably powerful states have ever been before, and this will certainly restrain ambition and rivalry on both sides. The question is whether the restraints will prove stronger than the pressures going the other way. If interdependence does trump strategic and political ambition, we should be seeing it happening between the United States and China now – but we have not seen much evidence of that yet. So far the two countries seem to be acting very much as strong states in the past have acted as relative power shifts from one to the other. Pessimists like John Mearsheimer and Niall Ferguson remind us that before war broke out in 1914, the great powers of Europe had grown more economically interdependent than they had ever been before, and than they would be again for almost a century.12

The lesson to draw is that interdependence increases the incentive for leaders to subordinate political ambitions and ignore nationalist sentiments, but it does not remove the need for them to take these bold and [politically] politicaly risky steps. The hard choices still have to be made. It is easy for leaders to see that economic interests require them to compromise their countries’ aspirations for international status and power, but it is harder for them to acknowledge that to their people, and harder still to put their economic interests ahead of strategic and political ones when a choice has to be made. In fact, most often people see it as shameful to put economic concerns first when issues of power and status are engaged. What president would tell the American people that their country will compromise its position on an issue like Taiwan in order to protect America’s economic interests? What Chinese leader could make the same argument to the Chinese people? When a choice has to be made, especially when it has to be made in the glare of an international crisis, it is very hard to put economics first.

In some ways the obvious importance of economic interdependence increases rather than limits the risk that rivalry will escalate, because of the way it can affect one country’s view of the other’s priorities. There seems to be a pattern here: each side believes that the imperatives of interdependence will press more heavily on the other. That inclines both governments to assume that the other will compromise to protect the economic relationship, so they do not have to do so. In Washington they expect China to back down from its challenge to America once Beijing understands the economic risks of rivalry. In Beijing they think America will blink. That makes both of them less inclined to compromise their own position – which makes escalation more likely.

Ultimately, faith in the power of interdependence boils down to faith in the power of money to trump other emotions and motivations. That is a risky proposition. We cannot assume that Chinese leaders will always choose rationally to maximise China’s objective benefits. They are no less liable than the leaders of any other country to allow what may be, or may seem to us to be, irrational desires for status and influence to trump the rational calculations of national interest.

Economics is important, but money isn’t everything. Countries, like people, want to be rich, but they also want to be safe and to feel good about themselves. For countries, as for individuals, aspirations for security and identity often compete with material interests, and often win. America’s and China’s divergent visions touch on very deep issues of national identity in both countries, which can easily seem to outweigh economic imperatives when the crunch comes. And there is always something a little strange about the assumption, implicit in the interdependence argument, that our economic desires will suppress the urge to strategic and political competition when our desire to avoid the horrors of war will not.

### Resources Advantage (Defense)

#### No causal evidence, only maybe true for the poorest countries, and government responses check

Rosegrant 13, Director of the Environment and Production Technology Division at the International Food Policy Research Institute, et al. (Mark W., 2013, “The Future of the Global Food Economy: Scenarios for Supply, Demand, and Prices”, in *Food Security and Sociopolitical Stability*, pg. 39-40

The food price spikes in the late 2000s caught the world’s attention, particularly when sharp increases in food and fuel prices in 2008 coincided with street demonstrations and riots in many countries. For 2008 and the two preceding years, researchers identified a significant number of countries (totaling 54) with protests during what was called the global food crisis (Benson et al. 2008). Violent protests occurred in 21 countries, and nonviolent protests occurred in 44 countries. Both types of protest took place in 11 countries. In a separate analysis, developing countries with low government effectiveness experienced more food price protests between 2007 and 2008 than countries with high government effectiveness (World Bank 201la). Although the incidence of violent protests was much higher in countries with less capable governance, many factors could be causing or contributing to these protests, such as government response tactics, rather than the initial food price spike.

Data on food riots and food prices have tracked together in recent years. Agricultural commodity prices started strengthening in international markets in 2006. In the latter half of 2007, as prices continued to rise, two or fewer food price riots per month were recorded (based on World Food Programme data, as reported in Brinkman and Hendrix 2011). As prices peaked and remained high during mid-2008, the number of riots increased dramatically, with a cumulative total of 84 by August 2008. Subsequently, both prices and the monthly number of protests declined.

Several researchers have studied the connection between food price shocks and conflict, finding at least some relationship between food prices and conflict. According to Dell et al. (2008), higher food prices lead to income declines and an increase in political instability, but only for poor countries. Researchers also found a positive and significant relationship between weather shocks (affecting food availability, prices, and real income) and the probability of suffering government repression or a civil war (Besley and Persson 2009). Arezki and Bruckner (2011) evaluated a constructed food price index and political variables, including data on riots and anti-government demonstrations and measures of civil unrest. Using data from 61 countries over the period 1970 to 2007, they found a direct connection between food price shocks and an increased likelihood of civil conflict, including riots and demonstrations.

Other researchers have broadened the analysis by considering government responses or underlying policies that affect local prices, and consequently influence outcomes and the linkage between food price shocks and conflict. Carter and Bates (2012) evaluated data from 30 developing countries for the time period 1961 to 2001, concluding that when governments mitigate the impact of food price shocks on urban consumers, the apparent relationship between food price shocks and civil war disappears. Moreover, when the urban consumers can expect a favorable response, the protests only serve as a motivation for a policy response rather than as a prelude to something more serious, such as violent demonstrations or even civil war.

Many in the international development community see war and conflict as a development issue, with a war or conflict severely damaging the local economy, which in turn leads to forced migration and dislocation, and ultimately acute food insecurity. Brinkman and Hendrix (2011) ask if it could be the other way around, with food insecurity causing conflict. Their answer, based on a review of the literature, is “a highly qualified yes,” especially for intrastate conflict. The primary reason is that insecurity itself heightens the risk of democratic breakdown and civil conflict. The linkage connecting food insecurity to conflict is contingent on levels of economic development (a stronger linkage for poorer countries), existing political institutions, and other factors. The researchers say establishing causation directly is elusive, considering a lack of evidence for explaining individual behavior. The debate over cause and effect is ongoing.

Policies can nevertheless be implemented to reduce price variability. Less costly forms of stabilization, at least in terms of government outlays, include reducing import tariffs (and quotas) to lower prices and restricting exports to increase food availability. However, these types of policy responses, while perhaps helping an individual country’s consumers in the short run, can lead to increased international price volatility, with potential for disproportionate adverse impacts on other countries that also may be experiencing food insecurity.

#### No loose nukes---countermeasures solve.

Mueller 20, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, member of the political science department and senior research scientist with the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at Ohio State University. (John, 06/24/20, “Nuclear Alarmism: Proliferation and Terrorism”, *Cato Institute*, <https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/nuclear-alarmism-proliferation-terrorism>)

Stealing or Illicitly Purchasing a Bomb: Loose Nukes

There has also been great worry about “loose nukes,” especially in postcommunist Russia — weapons, “suitcase bombs” in particular, that can be stolen or bought illicitly. A careful assessment conducted by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies has concluded that it is unlikely that any of those devices have been lost and that, regardless, their effectiveness would be very low or even nonexistent because they (like all nuclear weapons) require continual maintenance.39 Even some of those people most alarmed by the prospect of atomic terrorism have concluded, “It is probably true that there are no ‘loose nukes,’ transportable nuclear weapons missing from their proper storage locations and available for purchase in some way.“40

It might be added that Russia has an intense interest in controlling any weapons on its territory because it is likely to be a prime target of any illicit use by terrorist groups, particularly Chechen ones of course, with whom it has been waging a vicious on‐​and‐​off war for two decades. The government of Pakistan, which has been repeatedly threatened by terrorists, has a similar interest in controlling its nuclear weapons and material — and scientists. As noted by Stephen Younger, former head of nuclear weapons research and development at Los Alamos National Laboratory, “Regardless of what is reported in the news, all nuclear nations take the security of their weapons very seriously.“41 Even if a finished bomb were somehow lifted somewhere, the loss would soon be noted and a worldwide pursuit launched.

Moreover, finished bombs are outfitted with devices designed to trigger a nonnuclear explosion that would destroy the bomb if it were tampered with. And there are other security techniques: bombs can be kept disassembled with the components stored in separate high‐​security vaults, and security can be organized so that two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but also to store, maintain, and deploy it. If the terrorists seek to enlist (or force) the services of someone who already knows how to set off the bomb, they would find, as Younger stresses, that “only few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” Weapons designers know how a weapon works, he explains, but not the multiple types of signals necessary to set it off, and maintenance personnel are trained in only a limited set of functions.42

There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to fail, collapsing in full disarray — Pakistan is frequently brought up in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under those conditions, nuclear weapons would likely remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb would most likely end up going off in their own territory; would still have locks (and in the case of Pakistan would be disassembled); and could probably be followed, located, and hunted down by an alarmed international community. The worst‐​case scenario in that instance requires not only a failed state but also a considerable series of additional permissive conditions, including consistent (and perfect) insider complicity and a sequence of hasty, opportunistic decisions or developments that click flawlessly in a manner far more familiar to Hollywood scriptwriters than to people experienced with reality.43

## 1NR

### Resources Advantage (Oil Turn)

#### Outweighs on magnitude---only US Russia was causes extinction

Barratt et al 17, Owen Cotton-Barratt is a PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute. (“Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance” Global Priorities Project 2017 https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf)

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, even in an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia, despite horrific casualties, neither country’s population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast, fire, and radiation.8 The aftermath could be much worse: the burning of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere, which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption – a nuclear winter. According to one model 9 , an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons10 could lead to a drop in global temperatures of around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years. This could leave some survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious situation and the threat of extinction from other sources would be great. An exchange on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally deployed.11 Some models suggest that even a small regional nuclear war involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion people at risk of starvation,12 though this estimate might be pessimistic.13 Wars on this scale are unlikely to lead to outright human extinction, but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten civilisation. It should be emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area where increased academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt, would have high returns. It is very difficult to precisely estimate the probability of existential risk from nuclear war over the next century, and existing attempts leave very large confidence intervals. According to many experts, the most likely nuclear war at present is between India and Pakistan.14 However, given the relatively modest size of their arsenals, the risk of human extinction is plausibly greater from a conflict between the United States and Russia. Tensions between these countries have increased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further in the future.

#### **Outweighs on probability**

Beres 17 (Lois Rene Beres – emeritus professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University, “The Fast Track to Armageddon,” 10 February 2017, <https://www.usnews.com/opinion/world-report/articles/2017-02-10/donald-trump-iran-and-the-fast-track-to-nuclear-war-in-the-middle-east>)

Even if it is being played only by rational adversaries, the advancing strategic "game" would demand that each contestant relentlessly strive for "escalation dominance." Ominously, it is in the thoroughly unpracticed internal dynamics of any such rivalry that the serious prospect of a genuinely "Armageddon" scenario could sometime be realized. This intolerable outcome could be produced either in unexpected increments of escalation by any or all of the three dominant national players, or instead, by any sudden quantum leap in destructiveness undertaken by Iran, Israel and/or the United States.

The only thing that is wholly predictable in usefully deciphering such complex dynamics is that they are all unpredictable. For example, even under the best or optimum assumptions of enemy rationality, all pertinent decision-makers would have to concern themselves with miscalculations, errors in information, unauthorized uses of strategic weapons, mechanical or computer malfunctions, poorly recognized instances of cyberdefense, cyber-war and even adversarial coups d'etats.

In the final analysis, informed citizens and participants in these hideously complicated games of strategy will need to recall that it is mathematically meaningless to assign any comforting probabilities to unique events. Because an authentic nuclear war would represent precisely such an event, one with utterly unforeseen intersections, interactions and "synergies," we can never predict with any reassuring degree of precision whether such a conflict would actually be more or less probable. Indeed, should Trump ever proceed to strike Iran on the erroneously nonspecific assumption that his generals have already "got everything covered," he ought then to be reminded of the classic military warning of Carl von Clausewitz: Long before any military planners could even envision a nuclear war, the great Prussian general had cautioned about "friction," or "the difference between war on paper, and war as it actually is."

#### The link alone turns the aff---climate change policies that hurt economic development overseas causes global war and environmental backsliding

Risi ’17 (Lauren Herzer Risi – Master’s degree in Environmental Security and Peace @ the UN-mandated University for Peace in Costa Rica, senior program manager in the Environmental Change and Security Program at the Wilson Center, “Backdraft Revisited: The Conflict Potential of Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation,” 12 January 2017, https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2017/01/backdraft-revisited-conflict-potential-climate-change-adaptation-mitigation/)

Whether or not we respond to climate change – and the security implications of that decision – is a major public policy question. But increasingly experts are paying closer attention to how we respond.

At a recent Wilson Center event updating research on the unintended peace and conflict consequences of climate change responses – or “backdraft” – panelists said awareness of the need to respond to climate change has spread but things have otherwise changed little since the initiative began in 2010.

“In some ways, things are not as different as we thought,” said Ohio University Professor and ECSP Senior Advisor Geoff Dabelko. “Sectors are still operating in siloes in counter-productive ways.”

“We’re still bad at making climate change adaptation and mitigation policies that actually improve peoples’ lives in the things that actually concern them,” said Stacy VanDeveer, professor at the University of Massachusetts Boston.

Not only can failure to go in with “eyes open” result in failed projects, wasted resources, and missed opportunities, it can also lead to increased tensions and conflict. The event brought together experts from the academic and practitioner communities to explore where backdraft effects are playing out and how to address gaps in program and policy development.

Different Resources, Same Problems

One area of backdraft research is in extractive minerals used in the “green” economy. There is a large body of work on the impacts extractive industries can have on societies, from social, political, and economic dynamics, to environmental damage and violent conflict. Initiatives like the Kimberley Process (diamonds) and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (oil, gas, timber, other minerals) have been developed to increase transparency and reduce the potential for these valuable resources to contribute to violence.

Yet this work has not translated to the renewable energy and climate sectors. “Things like the renewable energy economy and high-tech economy are still the global economy that we’ve inhabited for some time,” said VanDeveer. “When you look at where the raw materials come from for renewable energy and battery technology, they still get mined. The extractive industries around the world still work very much like they have worked for quite a while.”

In research for International Alert, Janani Vivekananda found that the lack of a conflict-sensitive approach in northwest Kenya ultimately stalled a wind energy project there. “This was an initiative that needed to consult those people that used the land, and yet the consultation process – the prior informed consent process – involved elites in Nairobi rather than Turkana which was hundreds of miles away,” she said. Despite the fact that the nomadic communities in the area lacked electricity, there were no plans to share energy generated from the turbines.

“The conflict risks were very evident, had they looked at this from a conflict-sensitivity perspective,” Vivekananda said.

Understanding Local Effects of Global Solutions

Similar challenges can be seen in the implementation of REDD+, a mechanism to encourage the preservation of forests for their carbon trapping and to reduce emissions from deforestation, which are a substantial contribution to global emissions.

“REDD+ is mandated to use free, prior, and informed consent and to represent local populations in decisions, and yet it doesn’t,” said Jesse Ribot, professor and director of the Social Dimensions of Environmental Policy Program at the University of Illinois.

In a 30-case, 13-country study of REDD+ and its implementation in sub-Saharan Africa, Ribot found that in almost every case, local democracy was undermined and circumvented as a result of programs being rushed. “Democracy is slow,” said Ribot, and “many of the people mandated to implement this do not have the knowledge to even be able to define local democracy in a way they can operationalize it.”

Governance side effects have also been observed in Laos, said Kimberly Marion Suiseeya, assistant professor at Northwestern University. With its technical monitoring, reporting, and verification requirements, the implementation of REDD+ led to a “dramatic shift away from more flexible land use approaches, where communities can rotate their crops based on their needs and climate conditions, to having fixed properties.” Not only did this undermine community-level decision-making processes, but it led to reduced adaptive capacity, eroding resilience goals.

“Community networks for conflict resolution have started to break down,” Suiseeya said. “People are able to make claims [and] lay claim to specific resources that they otherwise wouldn’t have been able to in the past.”

“If you understand what’s going on in a particular place and if you drill down to a very local level, what you realize is that peoples’ identities have a lot to do with decisions they make and how they view the world,” said Edward Carr, professor at Clark University.

Climate models suggest that Mali, where Carr does research, will get warmer and drier as a result of climate change. A natural response might be to encourage farmers to change to crops that can withstand drier conditions. But men’s identities in that part of the world are closely tied to their ability to grow food for their families, Carr said, and the climate-friendly alternatives are sometimes cash crops rather than the traditional food stuffs. “So if you grow the crop, sell the crop, and buy food, that actually counts as being a failed farmer – you’re not able to feed your family through your own production directly.” This tension makes male farmers reluctant to change practices and could lead to unexpected social problems.

An Institutional Challenge

Not understanding the small-scale effects of solutions calibrated to address a grand problem is a common source of backdraft, said Ken Conca, a Wilson Center fellow and professor at American University.

“Often what constitutes a solution at one scale simply exports the problem to another,” Conca said. Lacking ways to perform multi-level analysis, something that looks like a cooperative solution at one level may create conflict at another, and such analysis is difficult given the many institutions responding to climate change, from the multi-lateral efforts of the United Nations, to regional and state-to-state efforts, national initiatives, cities, and on down.

#### Low prices kill climate success in the long term – destroys renewables industries and delegitimizes warming treaty commitments

Krauss ’16 (Clifford Krauss – National Business Correspondent at the New York Times. Diane Cardwell – Business Day reporter for the New York Times covering energy with a focus on renewables. “Climate Deal’s First Big Hurdle: The Draw of Cheap Oil,” 25 January 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/business/energy-environment/climate-deals-first-big-hurdle-the-draw-of-cheap-oil.html)

Barely a month after world leaders signed a sweeping agreement to reduce carbon emissions, the global commitment to renewable energy sources faces its first big test as the price of oil collapses. Buoyed by low gas prices, Americans are largely eschewing electric cars in favor of lower-mileage trucks and sport utility vehicles. Yet the Obama administration has shown no signs of backing off its requirement that automakers nearly double the fuel economy of their vehicles by 2025. In China, government officials are also taking steps to ensure that the recent plunge in oil prices to under $30 a barrel does not undermine its programs to improve energy efficiency. Earlier this month, the country’s top economic planning agency introduced a new regulation, effective immediately, aimed at deterring oil consumption. For the climate accord to work, governments must resist the lure of cheap fossil fuels in favor of policies that encourage and, in many cases, require the use of zero-carbon energy sources. But those policies can be expensive and politically unpopular, especially as traditional fuels become ever more affordable. “This will be a litmus test for the governments — whether or not they are serious about what they have done in Paris,” said Fatih Birol, executive director of the International Energy Agency. So far, there is no sign that the world’s two largest energy consumers — the United States and China — are wavering. With those two countries staying the course, albeit in the early days since the signing, there is optimism among backers of the accord that the momentum is too strong to stop. And despite the recent turmoil in energy markets, renewable industries are prospering. “The trend toward much greater penetration of low-carbon energy driven by policy and technological advancements is going to continue,” said Jason Bordoff, director of the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University and a former top aide to President Obama. Despite the lower fuel costs, he added, “technological alternatives and policy drivers that are reducing demand for fossil fuels are already really starting to take a bite.” A few days ago, the Energy Department projected that total renewable power consumed in the United States this year will increase by 9.5 percent, and the longer-term outlook appears bright as costs continue to plummet and after congressional action last December extended federal tax credits for new wind and solar projects. Utility-scale solar power generation alone is expected to increase by 45 percent by 2017, according to the Energy Department. Administration officials express an ambition to make wind power the source of more than a third of the American electricity supply by 2050. In China, the world’s biggest greenhouse gas emitter, the government implemented a new rule that no matter how low world crude oil prices may fall, the price of gasoline and diesel will continue to be set as though the world price of oil were still $40 a barrel. The goal is to prevent gasoline and diesel from becoming so cheap that China’s citizens would start consuming it indiscriminately. China’s heavily state-owned refining industry will also not be allowed to keep the extra profits from buying crude oil cheaply and selling gasoline and diesel as though the crude oil still cost $40 a barrel. Instead, the Chinese government will take the extra refining profit margin and put the money into a special fund for energy conservation and pollution control. But across the globe, the picture is not entirely rosy for zero-emission technologies. Several nuclear power plants, which emit virtually no greenhouse gases, have closed in the United States in recent years, and few are under construction in part because of the competition of cheap natural gas. Low oil prices also jeopardize the development of alternative fuels to replace petroleum in transportation and industry, including the advanced biofuels that once looked so promising. Cheap oil also reduces the price of diesel, the primary competitor of renewables in spreading electricity generation to impoverished rural areas of Africa and Southeast Asia. And if governments’ support wanes, the alternative fuel industries could take a hit. In Spain, the development of renewables has slowed to a crawl since the government started weakening support in 2009 because of an economic downturn. In Britain, analysts warn that the wind and solar industries could collapse as the government shifts subsidies away from renewables; two global wind developers recently canceled projects there. And in the United States, when an important tax credit lapsed briefly in 2013, installations of new wind farms all but ceased, falling 92 percent for the year. “The challenge for governments is to continue appropriate clean energy subsidies even while the fossil fuel industry clamors over low prices,” said Paul Bledsoe, who was a staff member of the White House Climate Change Task Force under former President Bill Clinton. Many developing countries have taken advantage of the decline in oil prices to cut subsidies on fuel consumption. India, Indonesia and Angola, among others, have taken such action, a move that economists say could conserve millions of barrels of oil from being burned every year in the future. Saudi Arabia, one of the top energy-consuming nations, this month increased gasoline prices by 50 percent, and natural gas for industry and electrical generation by 67 percent. Ultimately, supporters of the climate accord say that low oil prices can cut both ways in the march to renewables. “It’s a double-edged sword,” said Amy Myers Jaffe, executive director for energy and sustainability at the University of California, Davis. She noted that low oil prices were cutting investments in drilling, which meant fewer emissions of methane, a powerful greenhouse gas, at well sites, and “it has clearly not slowed down the switch toward renewable energy.” But at the same time, Ms. Jaffe said, low gasoline prices make driving more attractive, and in larger vehicles as well. “It’s [extremely destructive] ~~crippling~~ for electric cars,” she said, “because the thing that made you think about buying an electric car was it was so painful for you to fill up your car with gasoline that was so expensive.”

#### High prices put a cap on all conflict---solves both other advantages

Hillebrand 8, Associate Professor of International Economics Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce University of Kentucky (Evan, “ How Will Future Oil Prices Affect Geopolitics?,” <http://www.uky.edu/~ehill2/dynpage_upload/files/How%20Will%20Future%20Oil%20Prices%20Affect%20Geopolitics.pdf>

In the EIA work (see figure 35, reproduced below) world oil prices are assumed to take three possible widely divergent paths, from mid 2006 to 2030. Divergent price paths could be motivated in many different ways, such as differences in growth of demand, differences in assumptions about the technology of energy usage, or most importantly, differences in assumptions about the geological accessibility of oil. In the IEO2007 the different price paths result mainly from the assumption of different oilproduction paths outside of the United States. Further, it is assumed that those paths are dictated more by geological considerations than by policy choices or political constraints. 5 I constrained the IFs model to roughly replicate the world oil production assumptions portrayed in the IEO2007 scenarios. These scenarios show world oil production in 2030 ranging from 101.9 million barrels per day (mbd) in the high price/low production scenario, to 117.8 mbd in the reference case, to 127.7 mbd in the low price/high production case. The IEO scenarios are not integrated with a world economic model, nor are alternate fuels considered except in the US case. Thus I had to fill in the details, as it were, using the IFs model, which does integrate global demand and supply of 6 fuel sources (oil, coal, natural gas, hydro, nuclear, and other) with economic growth and energy demand in 182 countries. In the IFs model, economic growth in every country responds endogenously to change in energy production and energy prices. In addition, the IFs model projects quite substantial shifts among energy sources given large swings in relative prices. Thus the final results cannot be in any way construed to be implied by the DOE analysis: the DOE results are too sparse for that. The results reported are my own scenarios—based loosely on the DOE price and oil production assumptions—but using the IFs model as the basic platform for analysis. The different oil market assumptions, it will become clear, have quite dramatically different implications for global economic and political futures. In this work, as in the IEO2007 and in most other long-run forecasting work,2 the basecase is for continued strong global economic growth and some degree of convergence between the OECD and non-OECD countries. Growth rates are projected basically as a continuation of trends: strong technological growth in the OECD countries, 2 See, for example, the economic growth projections underlying the IPCC climate change projections at http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/ddc/sres/index.html (2000), or Maddison (2007). One major exception is Meadows et al. (2004) 6 strong investment coupled with continued modernization in non-OECD Asia, but a gradual slowing from the very high growth rates of recent decades. For the other nonOECD regions, the forecast assumes a gradual improvement in economic governance that leads to a more efficient use of capital and more domestic competition. Embedded in the base case is increasing globalization, a lack of major conflicts, and reasonably successful fiscal management by OECD and non-OECD governments. I imposed these energy and economic numbers on the IFs model3 and used the model to generate its own long range geopolitical scenario. The IFs model projects variables such as the level of democratization, geopolitical power, risk of domestic instability, and the risk of war4 . Under the base case energy and economic assumptions, and under the myriad assumptions underlying the IFs model, the geopolitical landscape shifts in a benign direction. Rising GDP per capita and generational change leading to larger percentages of populations growing up without want lead to growing democratization (Inglehart, 2000). Faster economic growth in China and the other non-OECD countries leads to a gradual decline in the share of world power held by the United States and the EU and a rise by China. Economic growth and consolidation of democracy lead to a diminution almost everywhere in the risk of internal war (Goldstone, 2004). The rise of great powers such as China and India compared to the relative decline of US power could lead to an increase in the risk of interstate war (Tamen, 2000), but this scenario assumes China and India, in particular, are satisfied powers (Kugler, 2006), that have adapted peacefully to the existing international order and see no need for warfare to validate their rising status. This result also conforms with Gartzke’s “Capitalist Peace” (2007) in which spreading economic interdependence erodes incentives for interstate war.

#### Russia’s on the brink

Osborn 20 (Andrew, “Putin's problems mount as coronavirus hits Russian economy,” <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-russia-putin-analy-idUSKCN2242WO>)

Putin has survived many crises before, and there is no sign that he is about to be toppled. But problems are piling up for the man who has dominated Russia since 2000. The price of oil, the Russian economy’s lifeblood, is at its lowest level in nearly two decades, and the rouble is now one of the world’s worst performing currencies. Gross domestic product could fall by 15% if oil prices drop below $10 per barrel, Russia’s biggest bank says. “There won’t be a macroeconomic meltdown but I’m worried about the population losing their livelihoods,” said Sergei Guriev, a senior economist who left Russia in 2013. Former finance minister Alexei Kudrin says the number of jobless Russians could more than triple to 8 million this year. And oil and gas revenues could drop by $165 billion, said Nordea Russia chief economist Tatiana Evdokimova, which would force the government to dig deep into its international reserves to fund the state budget, already facing a big shortfall. A nearly 26-trillion-rouble ($338-billion) programme, meant to contribute to Putin’s legacy, looks less likely than ever to lift living standards and improve infrastructure as much as hoped. “All these things combined amount to the single biggest challenge for Putin in his 20 years in power,” said Professor Sergei Medvedev, from Moscow’s Higher School of Economics. “The landscape has changed dramatically. Stability has been ruined, Putin has much less legitimacy, and dissent among the (political and business) elite may be brewing. The regime will be in survival mode for the next year, groping for reserves.” LOWER RATINGS Russia has reported almost 58,000 coronavirus cases, with 513 deaths, and Putin, 67, is working from an official residence outside Moscow where he holds meetings by video conference. At 63%, his approval rating is at its lowest level since 2013, according to the Levada pollster. There are also some early signs of social unrest over the situation -- an anti-lockdown rally in southern Russia on Monday, a scattering of online protests and growing complaints by small businesses that authorities are not doing enough to help them through the crisis. The Kremlin called the rally illegal, but said it was important to listen to people’s concerns. It has said the government will do more to help businesses if necessary. Private business owners have been told to suspend business, but to keep paying staff. Dariya Kaminskaya, who owns a car repair shop where work has dried up, told Reuters she had paid her seven employees out of her own pocket. “This is how revolutions were started in the past, beginning with the proletariat,” she said. A senior Russian businessman, who requested anonymity for fear of repercussions, said he expected a wave of bankruptcies among small businesses. “It probably won’t be as bad as 1991 (the year the Soviet Union collapsed). But it will be difficult. It could be that violence, big demonstrations won’t happen, but the population will be on the brink,” he said.

#### Russia had the cushion for COVID, but can’t withstand future demand shocks

Gladstone 20, analyst @ NYT (Rick, “Oil Collapse and Covid-19 Create Toxic Geopolitical Stew,” *New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/22/world/middleeast/oil-price-collapse-coronavirus.html>)

Russia has in many ways shrugged off the price tumble. Despite the drama on oil markets, the national currency, the ruble, dropped just 2 percent on Tuesday. The historically high oil prices of the past two decades had lifted the country economically and powered President Vladimir V. Putin’s ambitions. But Russia entered the crisis well prepared, with hard currency reserves and a tight budget put in place as protection against the Western sanctions of the past six years. Mr. Putin and his economic policy team can tap gold and hard currency reserves that total $565 billion. How long Russia can hold out, however, is unclear. Renaissance Capital, a Moscow investment bank, has estimated Russian reserves can support current spending at oil prices of $35 per barrel for six years. Signs have emerged that Mr. Putin is nervous. Cushioning the price collapse is not the only demand on Russia’s reserves: The country has not announced major bailouts for businesses harmed by coronavirus lockdowns, but they are likely.

#### Separatism. Extinction and root cause.

Wehner 20, Independent Scholar and Theorist in Economics and Political Science, Studied Economics and Political Science at the University of Hamburg (Burkhard, *Freedom, Peace, and Secession: New Dimensions of Democracy*, p. 11-13)

Democratic states have developed rules on how to create political power within their borders. The basic principle is that power is bestowed by the majority of citizens. But, which citizens get to decide (i.e., within which state borders majorities are to be determined, and thus power bestowed) is not subject to democratic decisions. State borders are treated as historically fixed and, generally, only modified in the course of revolution, war (between and within countries), disintegration of a state, or even by the arbitrary acts of autocrats. There are no provisions, not even in democracies, for modifying borders without conflict or dispute.

Separatist sentiment rarely succumbs completely even in times of political normalcy. Instead, separatists continuously assert the claims to freedom and self- determination denied them by prevailing dogmas and political practice. The resulting conflicts reveal separatism to be a symptom of a fundamental crisis of political ideology. In dealing with separatism, therefore, nothing less is at stake than the fate of the so-called liberal world of states. Thus, it is time to accept separatism, not as an inevitable and deplorable, but as a potentially fruitful challenge to political thought.

Such a constructive understanding of separatism will not easily prevail given its violent history. Although a certain amount of violence has always been deployed on both sides of separatist conflicts, such violence is still generally blamed on the separatists in the political discourse. Even when separatists fought for their goal by legal means, they were usually characterized as the villains of the political drama. Under such conditions, it seemed justified to judge separatism merely in legal categories and denounce separatists as lawbreakers.

Even though many individual separatist conflicts have been thoroughly explored, documented, and commented on, separatism itself has been given little attention as a fundamental problem in political theory. When separatist movements have made spectacular appearances, public interest often flared up reflexively but faded quickly when the situation had calmed and seemed clarified. In most such cases, clarification meant defeat or exhaustion of the separatists.

In the public consciousness, the impression has persisted that separatism, although perhaps ineradicable, would remain manageable by combatting its symp- toms in the same old ways (usually some form of oppression). Yet under such circumstances, separatism could not be perceived as a cause for questioning old political beliefs and developing new ones.

How fundamentally wrong this assessment is becoming apparent when separatism is examined across space and time. Then it becomes clear how widespread, durably, and sustainably separatism keeps parts of the world in suspense. While the last half century has been marked by a subsiding political conscience of the horrors of two great wars and colonialism, separatism has shown itself to be a lasting phenomenon; managing only to accelerate since the collapse of the Soviet Union as conflicts arose across the globe.

Not all related conflicts can be associated with this drama right from the beginning since separatist concerns often overlap with other conflicts of interest. Indeed, many conflicts in which a quest to define a new nationality plays a prominent role have been, and continue to be, misinterpreted primarily as conflicts over economic interests or as mere proxy wars, as in the case of the recent wars in the Middle East. These interpretations obscure what was and is really happening here: an unending global war. A multitude of widely scattered, intermittent and, in aggregate, centuries- long wars that follow a common internal logic.

Speaking of a world war in this context may seem exaggerated. But if this world war differs greatly from the two past ones, it is not with regard to the extent of the disaster, the suffering, and the destruction. The main difference lies in its dimension of time. The past world wars appeared like singular catastrophic events happening over a relatively short period of a few years. They were compact military, political, and humanitarian dramas. At the same time, these wars were mental dramas that stirred up and changed political consciousness within a short period; the ongoing world war is a drama of consciousness as well, but a gradual one. It is a true world war not only because it has claimed many millions of victims, it is also a world war in its geographical spread. Therefore, at least in the very long term, this war will also change political thought and action worldwide.

The true beginnings of this ongoing global war date back to far before the past world wars to the nascent stages of our current system of nation-states. The American Revolutionary War can certainly be ascribed to the previous history of the ongoing global war. Even more so, the American Civil War was a secessionist war in the modem sense, and in the light of the theory presented here, it requires a far more differentiated assessment than hitherto. Such a differentiated assessment suggests that the many hundreds of thousands of victims of this war were ultimately victims of an overly simple ideology.

The antecedents of the unending global war also include attempts to expel and annihilate populations for fear of an eventual separatist rebellion. Such evictions and genocides often do not lead to separatist war or civil war only due to the weakness of the victims. An example that could be interpreted in this sense is the Armenian Genocide which occurred between 1914 and 1923. Another, more recent, example is the Rohingya, who were expelled from Myanmar by the hundreds of thousands in 2017. In a broader sense, such events must also be associated with the ongoing global war.

As to this global war in the narrower sense, there are good reasons to take the war of independence in Biafra in southern Nigeria in the late 1960s as its beginning. According to various estimates, this war and its consequences alone killed 1-3 million people, and the number of refugees and displaced persons were also in the millions. This war, too, was an outbreak of a long-smoldering conflict that can be ascribed to the antecedents of the ongoing global war.

The cause of most major wars in history can be attributed to conflict over state borders. This is no different with the separatist wars in the context of the ongoing global war. The individual wars in this context are of a different kind than almost all previous ones. Earlier wars were usually waged by states, and their leaders, who felt powerful enough to forcibly change or proactively secure state borders to their advantage, be it in their neighborhoods or elsewhere in the world. In the ongoing global war, in contrast, it is mostly not aggressive rulers or governments who want to bring about the change, but citizens. Citizens, to be more precise, who are not voluntarily citizens of the state in which they live.

#### Middle East war leads to nuclear winter

Freedman 12, climate editor for the Capital Weather Gang at The Washington Post (Andrew, “The (Nuclear) Winter of Our Discontent,” Climate Central, https://www.climatecentral.org/news/the-nuclear-winter-of-our-discontent)

The specter of a nuclear conflagration looms in the tinderbox that is the Middle East and South Asia. While heads of state and military leaders game out every possible result, including the nightmarish worst-case scenarios, it's worth also contemplating the collateral ramifications of a nuclear conflict, including its potentially dramatic effects on the climate. Those ramifications, after all, would affect all of us, perhaps irrevocably. If a nuclear war were to break out in the Middle East or South Asia (or anywhere else, for that matter), the least of our short-term worries would be climate change. But, depending on the size and number of weapons used, as well as the specific targets hit, a nuclear conflict could seriously impact the global climate system, ushering in a period of dramatic global cooling. Even limited regional nuclear exchanges — which are more likely now that the number of nuclear weapons states has increased — would have major implications for the climate system that would be similar to, although not as severe as, the “nuclear winter” scenarios popularized during the Cold War, according to the most recent studies. In fact, modern climate simulations show that the climate system may be even more sensitive to a nuclear conflict than previously thought. Mushroom cloud of the first hydrogen bomb test. Credit: Reuters. One 2007 study found that smoke from 100 small nuclear weapons detonated in cities would affect the atmosphere more than major volcanic eruptions such as Mt. Pinatubo in 1991 or Mt. Tambora in 1815, and would last for a longer period as well. The eruption of Mt. Tambora famously led to the “Year Without a Summer” in 1816. Alan Robock of Rutgers University and his colleagues investigated the climatic effects of a nuclear exchange between two countries, during which each country uses 50 Hiroshima-size (15 kiloton) nuclear weapons to attack each other’s most populated urban areas. The study found that the soot and other pollutants from the detonations and subsequent fires would be vaulted high into the stratosphere, where they would reflect incoming solar radiation and cool the climate for years. Robock’s research has shown that a global average surface cooling of 1.25 degrees Celsius would follow a small-scale nuclear war, and a decade later the planet would still be 0.5 degrees C cooler than it otherwise would have been, with even more severe cooling occurring in North America and other land areas. For perspective, a 0.5 degree C change in global temperature is as powerful an effect as nearly three quarters of all the global warming caused by 250 years of manmade greenhouse gas emissions. Cooling of this magnitude could have major implications for global food production, which would take a major hit not only from cooler temperatures but also from decreased precipitation. According to Robock, impacts of this scale appear relatively close to what might occur in a nuclear war between Israel and a nuclear-armed Iran, neither of which is likely to possess superpower-sized nuclear arsenals during the next several years. (The size of Israel’s arsenal is unknown, and this again assumes that Iran develops nukes at all, let alone 50 of them.) This could also apply to other countries with modest but powerful nuclear arsenals, such as India and Pakistan.

#### If the plan succeeds at solving climate change, it decks exporter economies

Manley et al. 17

David Manley - National Resource Governance Institute, James Cust - The World Bank, and Giorgia Cecchinato – London School of Economics, “Stranded Nations? The Climate Policy Implications for Fossil Fuel-Rich Developing Countries,” Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies <https://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/images/Documents/OxCarre_Policy_Papers/OxCarrePP201634.pdf>

\*FFRDCs = fossil fuel rich developing countries

ABSTRACT Developing countries rich in fossil-fuels face a unique challenge posed by climate change. They seek to extract fossil fuels at a time when the global community must reduce carbon emissions. Effective global climate policies and low carbon technologies will likely reduce the demand for fossil fuels, creating the risk of ‘stranded nations’—where resources under the ground become commercially unattractive to extract and a substantial share of a nation’s wealth may permanently lose its value. This constitutes a parallel to the stranded assets challenge faced by the private sector. We identify three key challenges faced by fossil-fuel rich developing countries. First, we show that these countries are highly exposed to a decline in fossil fuel demand, with their median ratio of oil and gas reserves to GDP is 3.66, compared with a median for non-FFRCs of 0.58. Second, they are less able to diversify away from this risk than fossil fuel companies or investors - oil companies on average hold only around 13 years of reserves on their balance sheets, whereas FFRDCs hold a median of 45 years of known reserves at current production rates. Third, these countries often find themselves under pressures to implement policies that may expose them to further risk. For example, supporting fossil fuel linked infrastructure and skills that relies on long time horizons for payoffs to the country, subsidising fossil fuel consumption that extends carbon-intensity of production, or by investing state capital in fossil fuel linked assets such as national oil companies.

#### The aff wrecks prices by slashing demand

Summerton et al. ’16 (Philip Summerton – MSc in Sustainable Development and Environmental Economics @ the University of London, Managing Director of Cambridge Econometrics. Hector Pollitt. Sophie Billington. “Oil Market Futures,” April 2016, http://www.camecon.com/Libraries/Downloadable\_Files/OMF\_Summary\_-\_Final\_Version.sflb.ashx)

Policies to tackle climate change are likely to lead to lower oil prices, according to the results of this analysis. As governments start implementing the Paris Agreement, they will increasingly need to cut carbon emissions from transport by curbing the combustion of petroleum fuels. Lower oil prices will prevail in this lower-demand scenario, compared to a business-as-usual scenario where oil demand would rise unchecked and in line with economic growth and expanding mobility trends. Amid today’s low oil prices, it is easy to forget the long-term fundamentals. The sharp fall in oil prices since mid-2014 has created considerable uncertainty in global energy markets. Although initial reductions in the oil price were due to low-cost US shale oil production and OPEC’s response, more recently the volatility in prices has been due to short-term market uncertainty in light of unprecedented levels of oil stocks in rich countries, slowing economic growth in China, new supplies from Iran, among other factors. This follows a period in which geopolitical factors, such as confict in Ukraine and the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq, helped push oil prices to $100-$120 per barrel over the period 2011-2014. While short-term factors, such as geopolitics, speculation and sentiment, play a role in setting spot prices for oil, in the long-term the most important factors are those that affect the marginal cost of development. One such factor is the imperative to tackle climate change. Governments are meeting this challenge by setting policies that signal a longterm direction of travel for investment in low-carbon solutions. For example, the European Union is currently setting its energy policy goals for 2030, which themselves are infuenced by scientifc guidance that developed economies must be radically decarbonised by mid-century. In the time horizon of 2030-2050, it is most relevant to consider oil markets in terms of the long-term fundamentals. In a world without climate policies to drive investment in low-carbon technologies, this study fnds that global demand for oil would grow from 94 million barrels per day (mbpd) in 2015 to 112 mbpd in 2030, an increase of 19%. By 2050, demand would grow by a further 35% to 151 mbpd, primarily driven by economic growth in Asia and higher demand for aviation. The global crude oil market in 2015 had an excess of 2 mbpd of supply over demand due to rapid increases in US production and OPEC’s strategic response to maintain market share. However, anticipated growth in oil demand out to 2020 should absorb this over-supply, and existing production will continue to decline, aggravated by under-investment amid current low oil prices. This would lead to a situation in the 2020s where signifcant investment in new non-OPEC production capacity is needed, and oil prices will need to rise to around $80 per barrel to stimulate that production. Ultimately, without major new fnds or step changes in production techniques, increasing demand would push world prices above $90 per barrel by 2030 and over $130 per barrel by 2050 (in 2014 prices). By contrast, in a world where climate policies are being implemented to drive investment in low-carbon technologies, demand for oil will be signifcantly lower than in a business-as-usual case: by around 11 mbpd in 2030 and by 60 mbpd in 2050. This analysis found that vehicle effciency standards implemented globally between 2000-2015 have already prevented the consumption of around 5 billion barrels of oil. In our Technology Potential scenario, policies that further push vehicle effciency and electric-drive technologies into the market and reduce fuel consumption by aircraft and ships could lead to an infexion point in 2025, after which oil consumption would steadily decline. Cumulatively, these policies could cut oil demand by 260 billion barrels between 2015 and 2050.

#### Reforestation solves warming

Carrington 19 (Damian, “Tree planting 'has mind-blowing potential' to tackle climate crisis,” The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/jul/04/planting-billions-trees-best-tackle-climate-crisis-scientists-canopy-emissions>)

Planting billions of trees across the world is one of the biggest and cheapest ways of taking CO2 out of the atmosphere to tackle the climate crisis, according to scientists, who have made the first calculation of how many more trees could be planted without encroaching on crop land or urban areas. As trees grow, they absorb and store the carbon dioxide emissions that are driving global heating. New research estimates that a worldwide planting programme could remove two-thirds of all the emissions from human activities that remain in the atmosphere today, a figure the scientists describe as “mind-blowing”. The analysis found there are 1.7bn hectares of treeless land on which 1.2tn native tree saplings would naturally grow. That area is about 11% of all land and equivalent to the size of the US and China combined. Tropical areas could have 100% tree cover, while others would be more sparsely covered, meaning that on average about half the area would be under tree canopy. The scientists specifically excluded all fields used to grow crops and urban areas from their analysis. But they did include grazing land, on which the researchers say a few trees can also benefit sheep and cattle. “This new quantitative evaluation shows [forest] restoration isn’t just one of our climate change solutions, it is overwhelmingly the top one,” said Prof Tom Crowther at the Swiss university ETH Zürich, who led the research. “What blows my mind is the scale. I thought restoration would be in the top 10, but it is overwhelmingly more powerful than all of the other climate change solutions proposed.”